58.1 (The Master's Thesis with Michel Foucault as My Hero)

Abstract

This study is limited insofar as it deals with the texts of three critical attackers of Michel Foucault (Jürgen Habermas, Charles Taylor, and Isaac Balbus) and four critical defenders of him (Michael Kelly, Dominque Janicaud, William Connelly, and Jana Sawicki). It is strategically limited insofar as these texts provide a worthy yet manageable field of study which, at the very least, represents the more polarized end of the Foucauldian debate.

This study operates along two investigative axes: 1) underlying principles which generate and animate the polemical engagement and 2) strategies and tactics which specifically shape it. The underlying principles are *universalistic insistence* and *particularistic counter-insistence*. The three levels of strategic and tactical activity are *evaluative*, *argumentative,* and *rhetorical*.

This study, in order to economize, takes a dramatic form. There is a progressive disclosure of methodology, matter, character, and conflict. The arguments of Section I, springing from Habermas's critical attack on Foucault, emphasize the realm of the meaningful and truthful. The arguments of Section II, springing from Taylor's critical attack on Foucault, emphasize the realm of the moral. The arguments of Section III, springing from Balbus's critical attack on Foucault, emphasize the realm of the political.

In concert with the theme of scholarly polemics being a sophisticated and sublimated form of verbal warfare, this study demonstrates that the ideal of objectivity functions not only as the standard for removing the crudest aspects of partiality and prejudice, but also as the mask for their more refined but fundamental operation.

– Acknowledgement –

I wish to express my gratitude to those people primarily responsible for making this second year of study so amenable to my particular mode of learning: Dr. Murray Clarke, Mrs. Eugene Whittaker, and my thesis advisor, Dr. Vladimir Zeman. *Nil desperandum*.

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– Abbreviations –

AF	After Foucault: Humanistic Knowledge; Postmodern Challenges
CP	Critique and Power: Recasting the Foucault/Habermas Debate
FCR	Foucault: A Critical Reader
MF	Michel Foucault: Philosopher
PDM	The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity
PT	Political Theory, Vol. 13

– Introduction –

Let us grant that all thinkers have a pre-polemical philosophical disposition. And let us further grant that this disposition manifests itself as either one of two inclinations or two areas of overriding emphasis, interest, and attachment. The first is the prospect, the project, the feeling of the Harmonious Whole. The second is the prospect, the project, the feeling of the Highly Singular and Richly Distinctive. The polemicist most possessed by the first will insist, generally speaking, on the universal. The polemicist most possessed by the second will insist, generally speaking, on the particular. If the above is granted to be the case, then it is likely that such a state of affairs underlies and determines those discourses or debates showing signs of being preoccupied with the philosophical mission itself. With this in mind, we can say that the pre-polemical division between the universalistic and the particularistic will operate as rhetorical reservoirs or capacities for rhetorical assault which, rather than being the derived effects of the strength of specific arguments, will be themselves the *a priori* strength of these arguments. If it is acceptable to abbreviate matters here and, for the sake of moving straight to the polemical scene, avoid discussing in detail the latter's relation to the pre-polemical,[1] we may posit two operative or underlying principles of polemical engagement. They are *universalistic insistence* and *particularistic counter-insistence*. A strategically limited layout and study of the Foucauldian debate in relation to these two principles is the present undertaking.

The critical defenders of Michel Foucault, being in principle and in practise natural hosts of his main ideas and lines of thought, must operate with the particularistic insistence which informs them. For, despite his publicly professed antipathy to polemicists and polemics,[2] Foucault carries on

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1 There may be an objection precisely here. Why, philosophically speaking, should we allow this move? Why should not this relation be discussed and the nature of the pre-polemical more carefully outlined? To bring forth the latter would require, in truth, dealing with the question: Why do some people dispose themselves one way and others the opposite way? What makes for these philosophical orientations in the first place? But, again, from another angle we might ask: "Do not these questions already presuppose the legitimacy of insisting on a logical account of the whole? Are they not already committed – at least if there is the expectation of such an account – to one side? And, if such is the case, perhaps this study is already committed to the other. Perhaps it must and can only arise out of insistence on the particular as both the logical and the extra-logical.

2 "The polemicist, on the other hand, proceeds encased in privileges that he possesses in advance and will never agree to question. On principle, he possesses rights authorizing him to wage war and making that struggle a just undertaking, the person he confronts is not a partner in a search for truth, but an adversary, an enemy who is wrong, who is harmful and whose very existence constitutes a threat. . . . Has anyone ever seen a new idea come out of a polemic?" Thus we find Foucault, in one of his interviews, polemicizing against polemicists. (***The Foucault Reader***, ed. Paul Rabinow, London, England: Penguin Books, 1984, 182-183).

a critical campaign which, to a greater or lesser degree, receives a faithful echo in his supporters and which, however subtle, indirect, and carefully circumscribed it may be, worries and galvanizes various thinkers who incline, straightforwardly or otherwise, towards universalism. Naturally enough, they engage in a counter-campaign which has as its primary objective (to employ one of Foucault's own expressions) the cutting off of the king's head.[3] Less dramatically speaking, the critical strategy of attack is the targeting of the theoretical or quasi-theoretical dimension of Foucault's work. It is, specifically, the dislodgement of this dimension from the precise site of its practical employment and the insistence on independently revealing and critically examining it. It is the insistence, in other words, that it must conform to a universalistic profile and measure, a traditionally established view of philosophical theory and practise. On the other hand, the defenders of Foucault repeatedly point to the uniqueness or particularity of Foucault's "theory" which, qua theory, must in some sense turn away from itself, limit itself, seek its identity in the specific work of the present (or the past in relation to the present), and make no special claims or promises for the future. What finally takes place then is a break in the very concept of theoretical activity qua philosophical activity – a break which effectively puts two powerful capacities for systematizing thought in opposition.

The critical defenders, just as the critical attackers in relation to Foucault, target and take advantage of the main weakness of those who attack him. The critical strategy of defence, in other words, often involves a counter-problematization which is essentially the radical questioning of or placing into doubt the universalistic assumptions of these attackers. One easily gets the picture: a few vessels of bulk with a large number of smaller ones mixing it up in the surrounding waters – firing, returning fire, and cross-firing. Jürgen Habermas, himself no light vessel, calls this pitched battle, in an essay by the same name, "Modernity versus Postmodernity."[4] In his book entitled *The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity*,[5] he locates Foucault at the latter end of a line of philosophical thought stretching from Nietzsche and characterized by him (Habermas) as the radical critique of modernity. So far as the debate surrounding Foucault goes, the two lectures he devotes to him in this book are rather important.

This study concerns itself with these two lectures. It does not concern itself with later critical attacks on Foucault which, following in its wake and

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3 Michel Foucault, "Truth and Power," in ***Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other* Writings**, ed. Colin Gordon (New York: Pantheon Books, 1980), 121.
4 Jürgen Habermas, "Modernity versus Postmodernity," *New German Critique* 22 (Winter, 1981): 3-14.
5 Habermas, ***The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity***, trans. Frederick G. Lawrence (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1990).

making abundant reference to Habermas's, strategically vary little from it.[6] In order to make this study readable – perhaps even enjoyable – it must be sufficiently diverse yet unified, sufficiently personal yet balanced, and sufficiently select in its choices yet coordinated. So it is that, in addition to Habermas's critical attack and two "anti-Habermasian" defences of Foucault,[7] this study encompasses two lesser but fairly independent attacks,[8] each of which is the catalyst for a not-too-friendly (despite any appearance to the contrary) response from a Foucauldian ally.[9]

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6 See notes 64-70.

7 Michael Kelly, "Foucault, Habermas, and the Self-Referentiality of Critique," in ***Critique and Power: Recasting the Foucault/Habermas Debate***, ed. Michael Kelly (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1994), 185-210; and
Dominique Janicaud, "Rationality, Force, and Power: Foucault and Habermas's Criticisms," in ***Michel Foucault, Philosopher***, trans. Timothy J. Armstrong (Rutledge: New York, 1992), 283-302.

8 Charles Taylor, "Foucault on Freedom and Truth," in ***Foucault: A Critical Reader***, ed. David Couzens Hoy (London & New York: Basil Blackwell, 1986), 69-102; and Isaac Balbus, "Disciplining Women: Michel Foucault and the Power of Feminist Discourse," in ***After Foucault: Humanistic Knowledge, Postmodern Challenges****,* ed. Jonathan Arac (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rudgers University Press, 1991), 138-160.

9 William E. Connelly, "Taylor, Foucault, and Otherness," *Political Theory*, Vol. 13, N. 3 (August, 1985) 365-376; and Jana Sawicki, "Feminism and the Power of Foucaldian Discourse," in *After Foucault*, 161-178.

Section I: Habermas contra Foucault / Kelly and Janicaud contra Habermas

It should be duly noted that the title of this thesis (i.e., *The Debate between the Allies and Adversaries of Michel Foucault*) is, although (or, rather, on account of being) conveniently pithy and "high concept," a bit misleading. After all, rarely does one side of this debate, i.e., the critical attackers, respond directly to the other side.[10] They prefer (for reasons which would occupy another study) to engage, apart from Foucault himself, each other. They prefer, that is, to enter into a discussion which, although easily admitting second-order differences between them and hence a lateral flow of argumentation, is largely a repetition, renewal, or re-establishing of their earlier objectives and objections vis-a-vis critiquing Foucault.

Notwithstanding this asymmetry and lateral tendency, we may speak of a fairly divided and polarized polemical field. Moreover, this study, presenting specifically the strategically limited field of Foucauldian debate, emphasizes this division and polarization. However, it certainly does not exclude (as opposed to the above-mentioned lateral activity) a "soft-line" strategy of polemical engagement – a kind of attack or defence which signals a desire for a possibility of reconciliation. Such an inclusion, to be sure, also signals that there are strategies in essential opposition to the one of this study. For no doubt it would be wrong to imply that there is no polemical element or inclination precisely here, no underlying principle which, to some degree or other, forms the very presentation of polemical matters. Moreover, it signals in a third way that these matters are not all that simple in their relation to and involvement with these principles and that, for example, Michael Kelly's defence of Foucault, while particularistic in its deproblematizing of Habermas's case against him, is also "universalistic" in its bid "to focus on the appropriate ways to carry out their common project while recognizing their distinct yet correlative strategies" (**Critique and Power**, 391).

Perhaps this emphasis on division and polarization needs itself to be emphasized, this *de-emphasization,* in other words, of the "common project" which, even when this chord is struck by an opponent of those explicitly involved in or voicing such undertakings (i.e. by the Foucauldian whose first movement runs counter to the tradition), still suggests a bona fide spirit of coming together. Certainly this study must position itself elsewhere and, instead of insisting on the *rerum concordia discors*, make its indirect appeal to the *bellum omnium contra omnes*. Thus for us Kelly is, first and foremost, the opponent of Habermas and not the foundation-builder of a new understanding between the latter and Foucault.

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10 For an exception to the rule, see note 40.

On the other hand, it is still within the scope and spirit of this strategically limited study that Kelly present himself not only as a defender of Foucault, but as a recaster of their debate "so that," as he envisions, "philosophically adequate responses to it can be developed and defended" (**CP**, 366). How, he asks, can the universals which justify critique be themselves justified? (366). It is, we should suspect, the problem of the infinite regress that he is posing: every claim or assertion, initially presupposing or "proving" its independence, ultimately "presupposes" or discloses its non-independence. Can Foucault be taken to task for explicitly not providing what Habermas himself, according to Kelly, does not and, indeed, cannot provide? Habermas, of course, "can" do this sort of thing (by the mere fact of *insistence*) and, indeed, having already done it, solicits Kelly's response along with a number of, to say the least, more favourable ones. It consists of, for the most part, fifty-five pages of text (i.e., lectures nine and ten of *The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity*) which, along with their critical intent, seek to give a survey of Foucault's major works (except the last two).[11] As already set out in the Introduction, these two lectures occupy a place within a more or less general account of post-Hegelian thought which, at the same time, is a "genealogical" account of postmodernist thought.[12] Such a thorough contextualization of Foucault is, strategically speaking, the diminution of his distinctiveness by incorporating him in a larger, more populated space – a sub-tradition, that is, having distinction only insofar as it attempts to distance itself from the main one.

According to the Habermasian construal, philosophical thought takes the wrong turn when the young Hegel, forsaking an embryonic theory of reason grounded in intersubjective meaning and purpose, resolves the subject-object dilemma of modern philosophy by subjectivizing being itself (**PDM**, 27-37). Such a move spins out in two ways: the Left Hegelian way

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11 Not yet available to Habermas were the posthumously published second and third volumes of ***The History of Sexuality***. These are ***The Use of Pleasure***, trans. Robert Hurley (New York: Pantheon, 1985), and ***The Care of the Self***, trans. Robert Hurley (New York: Pantheon, 1986).

12 Dominique Janicaud states that "Habermas himself did after all sketch a genealogy of modern consciousness in *Der Philosophische der Moderne* . . ." *(Michel Foucault: Philosopher*, 299). No doubt we have here, in relation to Foucault's thought, a loose usage of the term *genealogy*. Properly speaking, what Foucault does is quite different from the history of thought which Habermas provides. After all, the latter is very much the conventional business of portraying certain people's ideas influencing other people's. Foucault's genealogy, on the other hand, focuses on social practises and forms of discipline wherein sites of subjectivity play a decidedly subordinate role. However, it is not so much that he is diagnosing or prescribing a *hierarchy* of subjective versus non-subjective (or conscious versus unconscious) elements. Rather, it is one of bringing into the foreground what remains largely hidden by virtue of a dominant role traditionally given to the conscious, willing, decision-making side of things.

which, with a will to reclaiming the concretely historical, returns subjectivity to essentially autonomous individuals confronting an objectified, material world (53-54); and the Right Hegelian way which, maintaining a quasi-religious attitude to the unfolding of events (qua reason writ large), continues the Hegelian stultification of the existential critique of modernity (56, 59-60). Then, "with Nietzsche's entrance into the discourse of modernity, the argument shifts, from the ground up" (85). Reason itself comes under attack as a dispiriting and ultimately destructive form of the will to power. Drawing from his Romantic heritage, Nietzsche invokes the notion of the other of reason, the primal, instinctive, chaotic forces of nature which, as they are subdued and reflected in myth, art, and religion, continuously reconcile the individual with the anonymous processes which throw up, squander, and ultimately efface him (85-88). Habermas sees the Nietzschean move as a splintering off from the counter-discourse which the Enlightenment traditionally understands as its self-critical side (94). In short, it is the would-be dethronement of reason qua philosophical inviolability by a kind of reasoning continually pointing beyond itself and, in its bid to conceal its own paradoxicality, attempting to avoid any self-reference. Later followers of Nietzsche mainly take two paths: the Heidegger-Derrida route and the Bataille-Foucault one (97). While both display no awareness of their own aporias, they seek to clear themselves of the aporias of the philosophy of the subject. The first goes the way of identifying the problem of the subject with the more fundamentally problematic tradition of metaphysics (97-98). The second follows the path of portraying the subject's rise and entanglement in the discourse of modernity (260-265). Between the two outcome ranges, roughly speaking, the spirit of postmodernism. Foucault is perhaps its most able representative with his radically historicizing and de-universalizing project (**PDM**, xiv).

Along with the strategic decentring of Foucault's thought (camouflaged or ambiguated to some degree by occasional honorifics), there are the evaluative claims of the contextualization which provide reference points for the selecting, emphasizing, and scrutinizing of various elements – for the, in other words, effective reconstruction of his thought. The most obvious move is, as already mentioned in the Introduction, the dislodgement and independent examination of the theoretical dimension. It allows for attaining the principal objective of problematizing Foucault, fashioning the main charges of the critical attack, and providing a focus for the two lectures if not the whole series of twelve. This focus is midway through the second of the two lectures in the form of three objections: i) Foucault's inadvertently *presentist* construal of the genealogically analysed past, ii) his *relativist* construal involving power-knowledge complexes, and iii) his *crypto-normativistic* stance vis-a-vis the implicit critique of genealogy and the political activity which presumably springs from it (276-284). Habermas

relates these three objections to three categories of valuation which, as he claims, are necessary to rational consensual activity. They are *meaning*, *validity*, and *value*.

Meaning: Foucault confounds it by explicitly denying the hermeneutic approach to the historical matter under investigation while implicitly framing this investigation according to the cultural, social, and political interests of the present (276-278).

Validity: He forfeits any claim to the true-false distinction "by not thinking genealogically when it comes to his *own* genealogical historiography . . ." (269). That is to say, his theory of power-knowledge, positing the historically contingent, institutionally implicated, and technologically formed substance of theory, clearly implies that his own must lack the force of independent truth (279).

Value: Foucault, emptying his theory of normative standards qua criteria of judgement, runs into confusion when the question of his own critical and political stances is put to him. Habermas, in order to drive this point home, employs the oft-quoted passage from Nancy Fraser's first article on Foucault.[13]

> Why is struggle preferable to submission? Why ought domination to be resisted? Only with the introduction of normative notions of some kind could he begin to tell us what is wrong with the modern power/knowledge regime and why we ought to oppose it (284).

Unlike Michael Kelly's defence of Foucault which ignores Habermas's contextualization and meets his objections with a substantially different reconstruction,[14] Dominique Janicaud's critical defence responds largely to it. However, he does take time to reconstruct carefully the whole of Habermas's problematization. (In so doing, he makes the claim that the three main objections of Habermas are essentially one.)[15] But after having given his impressive display of being able to grasp the intricacies of Habermas's case against Foucault, Janicaud, succeeding, as we might say, to a more authoritative position (by giving this "impressive display"), pronounces his verdict: Habermas "*does not understand* Nietzsche . . ." (Janicaud's italics,

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13 Nancy Fraser, "Foucault on Modern Power: Empirical Insights and Normative Confusions," *Praxis International* 1 (October, 1981), 272-287.

14 The following line from Kelly's essay sums up his whole defensive strategy: "Habermas's critique of Foucault is largely based on a single text, *Discipline and Punish*, and even more specifically on a particular interpretation of that text" (*Critique and Power*, 366).

15 "The other two criticisms [besides the charge of presentism] are largely redundant: it is in fact the same criticism shifted from the point of view of signification to that of truth and then value" (*Michel Foucault*, 291).

Michel Foucault, 292). Thus we may describe Janicaud's counter-strategy as the *problematizing* of Habermas's contextualization and, as a second or simultaneous movement, the *re-contextualizing* of Foucault's thought. In essence, Janicaud restores to the latter its distinctiveness by strategically destroying the connection to Foucault of a "professing Nietzschean irrationalism"[16] and replacing it with a connection to one "who, as is well known, (and this is one point on which the two interlocutors agree) profoundly shook Western thought, which suddenly had to become aware of its destiny regarding power" (**MF**, 291).

With Kelly, contextualization also carries evaluative force which, being at least in part conciliatory, denies to him a vigorous counter-offensive such as Janicaud's. This conciliatory aspect is, in fact, the formal purpose not only of his essay, but the book to which the essay belongs. This book, edited by Kelly himself and containing contributions by other scholars, is revealingly entitled *Critique and Power: Recasting the Foucault/Habermas Debate*.[17] As already noted, Kelly sees Habermas and Foucault faced with the same dilemma of self-referentiality. The immediate concern for him then is to counter Habermas's focussing on this problem such that he can give the impression, while making his case against Foucault, of having on his side the force of the better argument.[18] Ignoring, as already stated, Habermas's Nietzschean contextualization of Foucault, Kelly makes the case for a strictly Foucauldian theme – *local critique* (**CP**, 379-382). In order to find the Archimedean leverage point by which to shift aside the bulkier, more wide-ranging arguments of Habermas's critical attack, Kelly simply challenges his reading of one text, *Discipline and Punish*.[19] In other words, Kelly seizes on the quickest way to reverse Habermas's project of dislodging the theoretical dimension of Foucault's thought from his specific historical concerns. Thus the generalizing or universalizing of Foucault's analytic of power is countered by re-examining its use in the analysis of the French penal system from the late eighteenth to the mid-nineteenth century (367). The problem of self-referentiality, though certainly not disappearing, no longer assumes the central role it does with Habermas. Instead Kelly (and in this way he resembles Janicaud and virtually all other defenders) spends his time

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16 "Only in the context of his interpretation of Nietzsche does Foucault yield to the familiar melody of a *professing* irrationalism" (*Philosophical Discourse*, 278).

17 See note 7.

18 By giving the impression that he has the force of the better argument on his side, Habermas shows that he does not rely simply on argument. Statements such as the following illustrate the *rhetorical* contribution. "Naturally Foucault does not allow himself to be influenced by the ostensible lack of coercion of the cogent argument by which truth claims, and validity claims in general, prevail" (*Philosophical Discourse*, 247).

19 Foucault, ***Discipline and Punish***, trans. Alan Sheridan (New York: Vintage Books, 1979).

showing how unsympathetically a text of Foucault's is read when one demands of its theoretical dimension the carrying of a weight for which it was simply not designed. With a continual reference then to Habermas's universalizing of Foucault's notion of power, Kelly marshals textual evidence to support the opposite view.

> Of course, the mere mention of a disciplinary regime based on the panopticon which "extends it effects" is precisely what makes Habermas think Foucault is analysing modern society as a whole (**PDM**, 289). This makes it even more imperative that Foucault's comments about the panopticon be understood in the context of his discussion of Bentham's discursive ideal of the prison and other institutions (**CP**, 369).

Before elaborating on the above point by drawing extensively from *Discipline and Punish*, Kelly provides some comments by Foucault.

> In reference to the reduction of my analysis to that simplistic figure which is the metaphor of the Panopticon, I think that . . . it is easy to show that the analysis of power which I have made cannot at all be reduced to this figure . . . [I]t is true that I have showed that what we are talking about is precisely a utopia which had never functioned in the form in which it existed . . . (369).

But Kelly's whole effort, it should be noted, rests on nullifying or at least partially discounting a generalizing (or even, let us say, universalizing) tendency which, properly speaking, belongs to the text itself.

> Habermas's interpretation of Foucault unquestionably has some basis in *Discipline and Punish*, but it plays off an ambiguity in the text (367).

After citing a troublesome passage which gives the impression of a holistic enterprise (368), Kelly sums up his attitude which is also the strictly defensive side of his soft-line strategy.

> For three reasons I think Foucault's analysis in *Discipline and Punish* is first and foremost a discussion of the French prison and social system and not one of modern society in general: (1) the bulk of the text supports only the narrow or "local" project; (2) Foucault's own interpretation of the

> notion of power in *Discipline and Punish* does not focus on the carceral society; (3) his notion of "local critique" is limited to narrowly circumscribed genealogical analyses rather than to global theories about modern society (369).

Thus we see how it is that, as exemplified here and elsewhere, the particular, merely by *insisting* on itself, privileges itself discursively and forms the evaluative basis of a counter-discourse and counter-critique.[20]

It is one of Kelly's first moves to call into question Habermas's claim that Foucault's thought involves different methodological approaches to the *same* subject matter (367). (Let us note once again that this problematizing of Habermas's reconstruction differs as strategy from Janicaud's problematizing of Habermas's contextualization.) This subject matter is, almost interchangeably in Habermas's analysis, reason in modernity, modernity itself, the modern society, the philosophy of the subject, anthropologism, the "death" of the subject, the problem of subject-centred reason, and the rise of the human sciences in their complicity with power. Beginning with *Madness and Civilization*, he operates with the theme of Foucault's radical critique of modernity in its misguided opposition to the "affliction" of subject-centred or instrumental reason (**PDM**. 239). He tells us, to refer again to the above-mentioned text (i.e., *Madness and Civilization*) that is about a "history of the rise of the discourse in which psychiatrists of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries talk about madness" (239). But, even more important, it is about a "reason that has become monological [and] holds madness at arm's length from itself so as to safely gain mastery of it as an object cleansed of rational subjectivity" (239). Therefore what we finally end up with is a history of science "enlarged into a history of reason" (239).

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20 Naturally Kelly must account for the tendency of the text, at least on occasion, to work at cross-purposes. The common tactic here is simply to imply that the writer was careless.

> . . . [W]hile Habermas may misunderstand [Foucault's notions of disciplinary power and local critique], some of the misunderstandings undoubtedly arise from Foucault's own unclarity (*Critique and Power*, 366).

On the other hand, one can always claim the necessity of an informed or interpretative reading.

> . . . [A]s Jana Sawicki emphasizes, the inflammatory rhetoric in *Discipline and Punish* about the carceral society has to be understood in relation to Foucault's challenge to the equally inflammatory humanist rhetoric of progress . . . (370).

Foucault, as Habermas notes, later abandons the hermeneutic dimension which makes him suggest that madness has an originating source, a primordial existence apart from the discourses and practises which surround it (240). It is almost as if that Foucault wishes to pursue here "the rise of instrumental reason back to the point of primordial usurpation and of the split of a monadically hardening reason from mimesis . . ." (241). But "one who desires to unmask nothing but the naked image of subject-centred reason cannot abandon himself to the dream that befalls this reason in its 'anthropological slumber'" (241). Thus Foucault next pursues, according to Habermas, a structural analysis of discourse which, treating statements as constitutive and constituent events, leaves no epistemic remainder (241). In addition, he advances the kind of historical writing which, as "a kind of antiscience," integrates the human sciences with the history of reason and hence degrades them (241-242).

However, the earliest works, according to Habermas, still contain the same subject matter which occupy Foucault when he submits the human sciences to, first, archeological analysis and, second, genealogical investigations. Thus Habermas tells us that Foucault "retained to the end the epochal divisions that articulate the history of madness" (243). So it is too that, in agreement with the latter, "the end of the eighteenth century marks the peripeteia in the drama of the history of reason" (243). It is the point at which the earlier large-scale confinement of the insane in Europe reproduces itself in the form of "closed institutions with supervision by doctors for mentally diagnosed illness . . ." (244). Both of these events "serve to delimit heterogeneous elements out of that gradually stabilized monologue that the subject, raised in the end to the status of universal human reason, holds with itself through making everything around it into an object" (244). But, specific to the birth of the psychiatric institution and of the clinic in general, we must note that "it is exemplary for a form of disciplining that Foucault will describe later on purely and simply as the modern technology of domination" (245). It is by this route that Foucault will come to perceive "the monuments to victory of a regulatory reason that no longer subjugates only madness, but also the needs and desires of the individual organism, as well as the social body of an entire population" (245).

Habermas's universalistic reconstruction of Foucault, as already indicated when discussing the former's contextualization of the latter, becomes not only the evaluative basis by which to judge the particular aspects of his thought, but also the conceptually framed selection, arrangement, and profiling of these aspects. Those that, we may say, strike the critical defender as being quintessentially Foucauldian are thereby excluded, marginalised, degraded, or simply reevaluated. Of course, the critical attacker operates from the standpoint that he is merely retrieving or reclaiming what Foucault's analyses themselves exclude, marginalise,

degrade, or reevaluate. Thus Habermas proceeds, for example, by emphasizing and focussing on the structuralist link to Foucault's thought, particularly the archeological side of it, which Foucault himself minimizes and even repudiates.[21] In so doing, Habermas problematizes it.

> Such discourse – totally autonomous, detached from contextual constraints and functional conditions, guiding the underlying practices – clearly suffers from a conceptual difficulty. What then counts as fundamental are the rules (accessible to archeology) that make possible the ongoing discursive practice. However, these rules can make a discourse comprehensible only as regards its condition of possibility; they do not suffice to explain the discourse practice in its actual functioning – for there are no rules that govern their own application. A rule-governed discourse cannot itself govern the context in which it is implicated: "Thus, although nondiscursive influences in the form of social and institutional practices, skills, pedagogical practices and concrete models (e.g., Bentham's Panopticon) constantly intrude into Foucault's analysis . . . he must locate the productive power revealed by discursive practices in the regularity of these same practices. The result is the strange notion of regularities which regulate themselves" (268).

Furthermore, this emphasis on the structuralist link allows Habermas to explain Foucault's changing methodology not in terms of his taking up new problems (as, of course, both Foucault and his defenders insist),[22] but in terms of having *one* problem.

> Foucault escapes [the above] difficulty when he gives up the autonomy of the forms of knowledge in favour of their foundation within power technologies and *subordinates* the archeology of knowledge to the genealogy that explains the emergence of knowledge from practices of power (268).

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21 Cf. The Foreword to the English Edition in Foucault's ***The Order of Things***, ed. R. D. Laing (New York: Vintage Books, 1973), xiv; the Conclusion in Foucault's ***The Archeology of Knowledge***, trans. A. M. Sheridan Smith (New York: Pantheon Books, 1972), 199-211; and the interview "Critical Theory/Intellectual History" in *Critique and Power*, 109-114.
22 Cf., for example, Gary Gutting's introduction, "Michel Foucault: A User's Manual," in ***The Cambridge Companion to Foucault***, ed. Gary Gutting (Cambridge, Mass.: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 2-24.

In other words, what Habermas accomplishes by these manoeuvres is the establishing of a theoretical continuity and completion within Foucault's thought – an attempt by Foucault, perhaps surreptitious or perhaps unconscious (Habermas makes no explicit comment on this matter)[23] to fashion a grand theory of power in modern society.

This grand or total theory now becomes Habermas's express target (prior to the objection of a thrice paradoxical self-referentiality) and, moreover, allows him to grasp tightly the Proteus of a shifting methodology. According to Habermas, Foucault runs into a different version of the same problem which afflicted his archeological analyses, i.e., a transcendentally constitutive level of explanation which, either implicitly or explicitly operating at the empirical (i.e., historically factual) level, engenders a kind of theoretical sleight of hand (or, as Habermas more politely puts it, systematic ambiguity) (270).

> Foucault's genealogy of the human sciences enters on the scene in an irritating double role. On the one hand, it plays the *empirical role* of an analysis of technologies of power that are meant to explain the functional social context of the science of man. Here power relationships are of interest as conditions for the rise of scientific knowledge and as its social effects. On the other hand, the same genealogy plays the *transcendental role* of an analysis of technologies of power that are meant to explain how scientific discourse about man is possible at all. Here the interest is in power relationships as constitutive conditions for scientific knowledge. These two epistemological roles are no longer divided into two competing approaches that are merely related to the same object, the human subject in its life-expressions. [Note: Habermas is referring here to two main lines of thought in Foucault's *The Order of Things* – the "transcendental" role of epistemic regimes and the "empirical" role of anthropo-philosophical will to knowledge.] Instead, genealogical historiography is supposed to be both at once – functionalist social science and at the same time historical research into constitutive conditions (273-274).

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23 We receive only suggestive statements such as the following: "The *concealed* derivation [Habermas's italics] of the concept of power from the concept of the will to knowledge (originally formulated in terms of a critique of metaphysics) also explains the systematically ambiguous use of the category of 'power'" (*Philosophical Discourse*, 270).

In plain language, Habermas gives the outline and impression of a rather fraudulent move on the part of Foucault – the transformation of his earlier notion of an insatiable will to knowledge (generated by modern philosophy's and the human sciences' objectification of the subject) into the concept of a universal will to power (269-270). In order to clear up a major difficulty in archeological theory, Foucault, according to Habermas, masks the derivation of the concept of a universal will to power from the concept of a will to knowledge and proceeds as if power at the transcendentally constitutive level were explanatorily equivalent to epistemic regimes (*The Order of Things*)[24] and/or discursive formations (*The Archeology of Knowledge*).[25] Thus he positions himself to make the objection that what Foucault originally intended to be the hallmark of the problematic philosophy of the subject, i.e., the will to knowledge or self-knowledge as the will to an impossible self-transparency, becomes the universalistic claim of power's discreet (or not so discreet) operation within all discourses, practices, and realms of knowledge (270).

As already noted, Kelly's primary line of defence is simply to deny Habermas's thesis that Foucault always operates with the same subject matter (**CP**, 367). What Habermas goes to some length to show as being a theoretically distinct, ongoing project meets with Kelly's referring the matter to a misreading of the text which Habermas takes to be its culminating point. For it is clear that it is within the genealogical work of *Discipline and Punish* that Habermas locates the more or less completed form of an ambitious theoretical undertaking.[26] Now when Kelly gently argues or tries to convince us that this book is mainly about the French penal system and other French institutions (368), his much firmer but less explicit line is to honour the book (i.e., to respect its particular content). Hence the whole notion of a theory of power trying to explain everything is, along with Habermas's valiant attempt to argue this case, rather lightly set aside in favour of expounding on the central concept of disciplinary power and its explanatory relation to the "finer, more detailed phenomena" of institutionalized being (374).

It is entirely another matter with Dominique Janicaud's strategy of critical defence. Neither principally concerned with defending some main work of Foucault's nor even (except indirectly) some specific feature, his aggressive encounter with Habermas's critique is along the front of the Nietzsche-Foucault "philosophical elaboration of the understanding (and the intelligibility) of power in the modern contemporary world" (**MF**, 284). Far

24 See note 21.
25 *Ibid.*
26 In these two lectures on Foucault, Habermas treats ***The History of Sexuality****, Vol. I*, [trans. Robert Hurley (New York: Vintage Books, 1980)] as a sort of companion piece to *Discipline and Punish.*

from denying a theory of power either to Nietzsche or Foucault (and here he seems closer to Habermas than to Kelly), what he does deny is that this theory should have (or be taken to have) pretensions to totality.

> It is now time to bring to light, with regard to Foucault's work, the fundamental misunderstanding. . . . Habermas imputes to Foucault the desire to construct a theory of power which would arrive at definite and complete "solutions" (295).

At this point Janicaud, as it seems, wanders off a bit, speaking at length about Foucault's "indirect approach" to various topics (295). However, the detour does give the outline of Foucault's highly distinctive style, a manner of proceeding which, always somewhat tentative, circumspect, and even self-effacing, is nonetheless remarkably bold and challenging. But this way of proceeding, as Janicaud notes (while bringing his thoughts back to Habermas's critique) , is such that

> Foucault could not have been unaware of the fact that he would be accused of a 'systematic ambiguity' especially with regard to the problem of power. Yet could not one reply to a censor hungry for coherence that power is precisely the moving locus of unexpected exclusions, mutations, and shifts which make any *grand theory* of power abstract, even utopian? (296)

This rhetorical question as counter-thrust certainly refers itself to Nietzsche's as well as Foucault's thought and, as we have already noted, is the problematizing of Habermas's *contextualization* of Foucault. Instead of a modernity afflicted by rampant instrumental reason qua subject-centred reason (Habermas), Janicaud sees the modern affliction as rampant instrumental reason qua theoretico-technological domination by reason (283). Strategically speaking, we may say that Janicaud's counter-reconstruction of Foucault's thought (minimal though it may be) is a *recontextualization* of it via a counter-reconstruction of the Nietzschean legacy. To this end, Janicaud makes a fierce, scattergun kind of attack on Habermas's submerged thesis of a Nietzschean irrationalism.

> Yet there is a more serious problem. It is necessary to get to the bottom of the misunderstanding (292).
>
> [Habermas's] pseudo-résumé of Nietzsche's thought shows that [he] *does not understand* Nietzsche . . ."

(292).

> There is no rationality [according to Habermas's construal]; there are only the effects of power; such would be the substance of Nietzsche's teaching faithfully applied by Foucault in his historiography of discursive practices (292).

> But what is being refuted? Nietzsche or his shadow? Foucault or his caricature? Is it necessary to go over the demonstration again, this time on Nietzsche's side? (293).

> In Nietzsche the questioning of rationality can by no means be reduced to a naive dispute on the surface level between the intrinsic and formal validity of truth judgements. Nietzsche never contested either the coherence or the interest of the logical, mathematical, or scientific corpus (293).

> From *The Birth of Tragedy* onwards the question which preoccupied Nietzsche was that of the potentiality of great art as a civilizing force (293).

> Nietzsche is proposing nothing less than measuring the scope of Western history against the history of truth (294).

> Even the title sets the tone: 'Nietzsche als Drehscheibe': Nietzsche as turntable! Not only is this (false) understanding of Nietzsche worthy of a railway engineer, it is also purely historicist (294).

> It is not surprising therefore that we get a distorted view of Foucault from Habermas's criticism (294).

With the critical defenders of Foucault, we may say that a universalistic *counter-tendenc*y, subordinate to and paradoxically supportive of the main tendency, provides the background, the foil, and perhaps even the pretext for the valuing and evaluating process. In the case of Kelly, the common concern which Foucault and Habermas share, the paradoxical self-referentiality of modern critique, is also the counter-contextualization wherein pride of place is given to the Foucauldian project of genealogy. It is true that Kelly insists on a place for Habermas but, as we should note, he

seems to disqualify him until such time as he becomes more of a Foucauldian. For Kelly presents Habermas's insistence on historical/ahistorical Enlightenment values as being the main obstacle to an improved dialogue between the Habermasian and the Foucauldian camps (**CP**, 390). The suspicion therefore arises that, strategically speaking, disqualification is the covert policy of Kelly and that his soft-line defence is really presenting the case for a hegemonic kind of genealogy. For if the Habermasian project were to dispense with necessary universals and embrace Foucauldian universals qua historical variables (398), how could it preserve itself in a recognizable form?

Perhaps the matter is worth looking into a little more closely. Certainly the first impression one receives is not that of a crypto-universalist. In fact, Kelly takes great pains to show the specificity of genealogical work. Not only, for example, does he discuss the recovery of subjugated, marginalised knowledge by Foucault himself (379-380), but he also illustrates a case related to his own professional experience (380). At the same time, he argues for the affinity between Habermas's critique of modernity and Foucault's (389). In so doing, however, Foucault's critique begins to look less and less like a counter-discourse and more and more like a mainline one. The hegemonic undercurrent of Kelly's conciliatory operation comes through in the following passage.

> . . . [I]t is beginning to seem that the more Foucault's and Habermas's respective positions on the issue of universals are clarified, the less they differ. Foucault says universals are variables that must be criticized constantly, while Habermas calls them stand-ins that are revisable. There is a real difference, however, at least so long as Habermas continues to explore strategies to articulate and justify the "moment of unconditionality" built into actual processes of mutual understanding (PDM, 322) and so long as Foucauldians question the possibility of such unconditionality. Habermas pursues these strategies because he believes that universal norms are necessary for critique in all the modern discursive and concrete practices, whereas Foucauldians practice critique successfully with universals as variables (389).

Much of Kelly's essay devotes itself to showing how "successful" this practise is. At the same time, he gives no indication how the two critiques would draw closer together with reciprocal gains or unique results. Moreover, Kelly goes on very shortly to cast suspicion on the efficacity of Habermasian critique. Admitting that the issue of transhistorical validity and universality is

indeterminate (despite Foucault's providing "powerful evidence for the conclusion that [Habermas's] strategies will never succeed") (390), Kelly concludes his essay along these lines:

> Although Habermas may think the indeterminacy buys time for his position by putting the onus of proof on those who deny transhistorical validity and universality, I think it works in Foucault's favor instead; for he works with the correlation between knowledge and power and between critique and power, whereas Habermas insists on their separation without being able to defend it successfully, since what he defends analytically can so far not be found empirically. Foucault can practice critique now, while Habermas must wait (or else operate with counterfactuals) (390).

With such glowing and dismal reports to make the distinction between Foucault and Habermas, Kelly, as even the most hard-bitten Foucauldian might be prepared to admit, cuts away the ground from Habermas even while presumably establishing the ground which he shares with Foucault.

With respect to Janicaud's critical defence, the universalistic counter-tendency, being overtly hostile to theories such as Habermas's which implicitly claim their innocence or non-involvement with power, engenders conciliatory gestures only at the level of scholarly propriety.

> Is the change in model suggested by Habermas from a philosophy of consciousness to a philosophy of communication sufficient? The edification of a complex, non-functionalist theory of communication is a worthy enterprise; but does it not run the risk of remaining abstract and even edifying in a purely useless sort of way, so long as its recourse to a *normativity* interior to rationality sees this rationality in terms of a comfortable and artificial autonomy, turning away from the most disturbing power effects of scientific rationality itself? (**MF**, 298).

Referring everything to the importance of Nietzsche's first raising the issue of modern power (and doing so in a way which, as we should note again, reverses Habermas's critical evaluation), Janicaud fashions it so that Foucault ends up in the light of the Nietzschean sun while Habermas stands in the darkness of his own critical attack on Foucault and misunderstanding of Nietzsche. Instead of a body of thought, in other words, which loses its

lustre by virtue of its derivation from an earlier and highly suspect one, Janicaud presents Foucault's brilliance as being the eminent reflection of the "terrifying flashes of genius" of the nineteenth century thinker. Hence this essay, although subtitled "Foucault and Habermas's Criticisms,"[27] counter-reconstructs Nietzsche's thought much more than it does Foucault's.

The universalistic insistence of Habermas and the universalistic counter-tendencies of Kelly and Janicaud are ultimately the difference between the view (covert or otherwise) of an imperious logicality inherent to both knowledge and being and the view (covert or otherwise) of an illogical, primary otherness. With the first, the problem is always the one of *displacing the seemingly irrational* in favour of the "rational" and, with the other, the problem is always the one of *displacing the seemingly rational* while underlining and preserving the "rational" in this very act of displacement. Thus, for Habermas, Foucault's thought poses itself as a mixture of uncertainty, ambiguity, and paradoxicality which must be exposed and, by so exposing it, cleansing the epistemic space it occupies of the irrational elements which contaminate it. On the other hand, the critical defenders of Foucault, holding this epistemic space to be, at least for the time being, the very site of the rational, regard Habermas's thought as being representative of only the seemingly rational which must be challenged and dethroned. It is, as we may very well suspect, an irreconcilable opposition with both sides nevertheless feeding off each other, gaining from time to time the upper hand over one another, and forming countless mergers and quasi-reconciliations which only attend the moment of their breakup.

Strategically speaking then, Habermas always operates with his sights set on the impudent, wayward fact of Foucault and, instead of relating this "fact" to its own universalistic counter-tendency (and by so doing nuancing, sharpening, and in effect rearticulating it), he critically attacks it by *logicalizing* it. It would be safe to say, in other words, that, with respect to the problem of the relationship between discourse and practise, there is, for Foucault, no one answer but rather different converging approaches, explanations, or "answers." Their point of convergence must be, so to speak, in the imagination (i.e., beyond logic). Obviously such a procedure works with thinkers who delight in the highly distinctive and workable nature of this kind of operation. For Habermas, on the other hand, what truly matters, especially in his role as a critical attacker, is the fact that, at the end of the day, Foucault fluctuates between making discourse the basis of practise and practise the basis of discourse.

> There is some unclarity, to begin with, regarding the problem of how discourse – scientific and non-scientific –

27 See note 7.

> are related to practices; whether one governs the other, whether their relationship is to be conceived as that of base to superstructure, or on the model of a circular causality, or as an interplay of structure and event (**PDM**, 243).

Furthermore, when Foucault seemingly aims at making discourse the basis of practise (or, for that matter, practise the basis of discourse), he cannot account for how the former affects and alters the latter.

> Both [the Heidegger-Derrida and the Foucault side of the Nietzschean program] neutralize the straightforwardly raised validity claims of the types of philosophical and scientific discourses they study by referring either to an epochal understanding of Being or to the formation rules for a given discourse. It is these that are supposed to first make possible the meaning of entities and the validity of statements within the horizon of a given world or of an established discourse. Both also agree that world horizons or discourse formations undergo change; but in these changes they maintain their transcendental power over whatever unfolds *within* the totalities shaped by them. This excludes a dialectical or circular feedback effect of either the ontic occurrence or the referents upon the history of the conditions of their possibility – whether these conditions are construed ontologically or in terms of discourse formation (254).

In a similar way, the problem of the relationship between knowledge and power which, for Foucault, emphasizing knowledge over power in early studies of a particular focus and power over knowledge in later ones, becomes, for Habermas (because Foucault never picks up again and reasserts the former), a theoretical shift in emphasis which finally asserts power over knowledge. Thereupon Habermas draws a hard line around the later resettlement and articulates it in the form of a reductionistic dilemma.

> Such a strong thesis [i.e., the indissoluble unity between the formation of power and the formation of knowledge] cannot, of course, be grounded just with functionalist arguments. Foucault only shows how disciplinary effects , similar to the effects of technologies of power, can be obtained through the application of knowledge from the human sciences in therapies and social technologies. In

> order to prove what he wants, he would have to demonstrate (for example, in the framework of a transcendental-pragmatic epistemology) that specific strategies of power are transposed into corresponding strategies for the objectification of ordinary language experiences, and consequently that they prejudice the meaning of the use of theoretical propositions about object domains constituted in this way (272).

Habermas, being a relentless attacker, goes on to highlight the incoherence of those power-knowledge regimes which, enfolding validity-claims within themselves, can offer no ground or justification for the genealogical enterprise itself.

> . . . [N]ot only are truth claims confined to the discourses within which they arise; they exhaust their entire significance in the functional contribution they make to the self-maintenance of a given totality of discourse. That is to say, the meaning of validity claims consists in the power effects they have. On the other hand, this basic assumption of the theory of power is self-referential; if it is correct, it must destroy the foundations of the research inspired by it as well. But if the truth claims that Foucault himself raises for his genealogy of knowledge were in fact illusory and amounted to no more than the effects that this theory is capable of releasing within the circle of its adherents, then the entire undertaking of a critical unmasking of the human sciences would lose its point (279).

Now at this point we may well ask, is Foucault still up to any more tricks? Habermas thinks so. He notes that, although seeming to justify his work on the basis of its exposing and rebelling against the tyranny of traditional thought (280), Foucault cannot really claim that this basis itself is free from coercion.

> Foucault's concept of power does not permit such a concept of counterpower that grants cognitive privilege . . . Every counterpower already moves within the horizon of the power that it fights; and it is transformed, as soon as it is victorious, into a power-complex that provokes a new counterpower (281).

Fiercely bent on chasing his quarry straight to his lair, Habermas discovers this lair to be, according to Foucault, *biopower* and, according to Habermas's own reckoning, *Lebensphilosophie.* (285). That is, Foucault ultimately ends up employing as a basis of value and meaning "that nonverbalizable language of the body on which pain has been afflicted [and] which refuses to be sublated into discourse."

> [But] Foucault cannot, of course, make this interpretation his own though it surely finds a basis in some of his more revealing gestures. Otherwise . . . he would have to confer upon the other of reason the status that he has denied it, with good reason, ever since *Madness and Civilization* (286).

The game is over. By virtue of his being flushed out of his hiding place, the would-be exposer is himself exposed, his fraudulent circling back to a seemingly discarded starting point unmasked.

Now it must surely come as no surprise that the critical defenders repudiate this highly sophisticated form of what, at the ontological level, is the crude and no doubt erroneous game of "P v -P." Either Foucault, according to it, holds position X and this position, being ascertained by a critical opponent to be at least trying to give the impression of a strictly logical account of all social being, is in fact strictly logical, or Foucault's thought is, in the main, invalid. Kelly, for example, asks himself whether it makes sense for Habermas to charge Foucault with relativism "unless something like the opposite – absolutism? – were firmly established" (**CP**, 387). He goes on to show how little of a case Habermas seems to make for himself qua absolutist.[28] Janicaud, taking up Habermas's objection that truth can have no genuine existence inside *or* outside power-complexes, simply lets Foucault address the matter "to show how much more subtle it is than the way Habermas presents it" (**MF**, 296).

> Of course, if one places oneself on the level of a proposition, on the inside of a discourse, the divide between the true and the false is neither arbitrary nor modifiable, nor institutional, nor violent. But if one situates oneself on a different level, if one seeks to know

28 "For Habermas himself acknowledges that the 'idealizing presuppositions' of communicative action which are constitutive of modernity – the conditions of symmetry and reciprocity inherent in the mutual recognition of validity claims – emerged at a specific time in history and are thus not a priori. In addition, he argues that our rational reconstructions of these presuppositions, which are themselves unavoidable, are fallible" (*Critique and Power*, 387-388).

> what the nature was and still is, through our discourse, of this will to truth which has gone through so many centuries of our history, or what is, in a very general form, the type of division which orders our will to know, then what one sees taking shape is perhaps something like a system of exclusion (a historical, modifiable, institutionally constraining system) (296).

Janicaud then adds the following comments:

> The *if* is the most important thing. In this there is a working hypothesis. One can choose a *different scale* from the traditional perspective, which can act as the *revealer* of something non-said lodged in the relations of submission, exclusion, and violence which are not manifested by the self-envelopment of discourse, nor by the self-reference of philosophy as a sovereign *logos*. Is Foucault here giving way to an anti-rationalist *pathos* and to a will to invalidate rational discourse? The point is rather to broaden the horizon, to make archeologically apparent the 'will to truth' which underlies the self-constitution of the true according to relations which are perhaps not simple and which need precisely to be deciphered. Also, it cannot be denied that the universal *Geltungansprüche*, the claims of universal validity dear to Habermas, are not those which have regulated the course of history (297).

It now remains to examine purely *rhetorical* tactics. These are, in scholarly polemical engagement, submerged motifs or thematic lines which, usually in a fairly indirect way, honour or disparage. In other words, they surreptitiously serve the strategic objective of decentring or invalidating the opponent's thought. By operating very closely to the main lines of argument and, at the same time, employing with cumulative effect such relatively minor manoeuvres as repetition, selection, citation, exemplification, magnification, minimization, suggestion, and juxtaposition, the evaluative basis of these arguments achieves a continuous discursive presence. It would be a very large undertaking to analyse systematically this dimension of the polemical scene. Rather let us simplify matters here by synoptically presenting these submerged motifs or thematic lines and, by way of linked citations, allowing them to speak for themselves.

With respect to Habermas's critical attack, we may distinguish four such thematic lines. They are in effect rhetorical assaults on Foucault's

originality, *positive contribution*, *integrity*, and *coherency*. In order to avoid repetition and to shorten even further this specific investigation, let us ignore the rhetorical assault on Foucault's coherency.

The rhetorical assault on Foucault's ***originality****:* Foucault "calls Bataille one of his mentors. He is fascinated by [him] . . . as someone who enriches the language with gestures of waste and excess and transgression of limits . . ." (**PDM**, 238). Foucault himself admits that he "was dominated by a badly resolved conflict between a passion for Blanchot and Bataille on the one hand, and an interest in certain positive studies like those of Dumézil and Levi-Strauss on the other" (238). "Like many of his contemporaries, Foucault was also taken with the structuralist revolution" (239). "These three lines of tradition indicated by the names of Levi-Strauss, Bataille, and Bachelard are joined together . . ." in his first book, *Madness and Civilization* (239). Here he examines "those processes of exclusion, proscription, and outlawing in whose traces Bataille had read the history of Western rationality" (239). And it is in this book "that a Romantic motif comes through that Foucault will later give up. Just as Bataille . . . [did in his way], so Foucault suspects that behind the psychiatrically engendered phenomena of mental illness . . . there is something authentic whose sealed mouth need only be opened up" (240). But with his turn away from this Romantic motif and towards archeology, there comes the "suggestion . . . of a conception of historical writing that Foucault, under the influence of Nietzsche, from the late 1960s set over against the human sciences . . . as a kind of anti-science" (241-242).

"Foucault owes the concept of an erudite-positivistic historiography in the appearance of an anti-science to his reception of Nietzsche . . ." (249). Here the critique of modernity establishes itself upon the concept of power. "Nietzsche's authority, from which this utterly unsociological concept is borrowed, is not enough to justify its systematic usage. [But] the political context of Foucault's reception of Nietzsche – disappointment with the failure of the 1968 revolt – makes the concept of a historiography of the human sciences as a critique of reason biographically intelligible" (249). It is Foucault's desire to escape the "hollow humanism" of earlier historians which "explains why Nietzsche's 'Second Untimely Meditation' is a mine for Foucault" (249).

In order to put an end to global historiography, "Foucault borrows from the *Annales* school the programmatically deployed notions of a structuralist procedure . . ." (251). There then "emerges the outline of a transcendental historicism at once inherited from and going beyond Nietzsche's critique of historicism" (252). "Foucault's radical historiography remains 'transcendental' in a weak sense inasmuch as . . . [it relies on] structuralist methods" (252). Insofar as he speaks of discursive exclusion, "Foucault

takes up the heritage of Bataille's heterology in his archeology of knowledge" (252). But his later reliance on the concept of power "is by no means trivial, and certainly not to be grounded on Nietzsche's authority alone" (254). This concept of power definitely generates problems for him. "Like Heidegger, Foucault also undertakes a fusion of opposed meanings; but here an amalgam results that allows him to follow in the footsteps of Bataille and connect up with Nietzsche's critique of ideology" (256).

"The *Order of Things* raises problems to which Foucault responds some years later . . ." (266). "First of all, [he] must have been irritated by the affinity that obviously existed between his archeology of the human sciences and Heidegger's critique of the metaphysics of the modern age" (266). And "just as problematic as his proximity to Heidegger is his nearness to structuralism. In *The Order of Things* Foucault wants to respond with a liberatory philosophical laugh . . . reminiscent of the laughter of Zarathustra" (267). "Evidently Foucault then regarded contemporary structuralism . . . as alone capable of thinking 'the void left by man's disappearance.' The originally planned subtitle for the book, 'Archeology of Structuralism,' was by no means intended critically. But this perspective had to dissolve as soon as it became clear that structuralism had already covertly supplied the model for the description of the classical form of knowledge" (267).

Later, when Foucault recognizes the relativistic dilemma of his genealogy, he, instead of responding to it, "professes allegiance to an embattled perspectivism only in the context of his reception of Nietzsche" (281).

The rhetorical assault on Foucault's ***positive contribution****:* "Genealogical historiography [is] . . . the critique of reason qua antiscience . . ." (249). "The new history has to negate all those presuppositions that have been constitutive for the historical consciousness of modernity and for the philosophy of history and the historical Enlightenment since the end of the eighteenth century" (249). " . . . [W]ith a similar purpose in mind, Nietzsche had subjected the historicism of his time to a relentless attack" (249). It is therefore a principal part of Foucault's task "to dissolve the illusion of identity, especially the putative identity of the history-writing subject himself and his contemporaries" (250). "The new history makes use not of *verstehen* but of the destruction and dismantling of that context of effective history which putatively links the historian with his object . . ." (250). It also "change[s] talkative documents into mute *monuments* . . ." (Habermas's italics, 250). It puts "an end to global historiography . . ." (251). "History in the singular has to be dissolved, not indeed into a manifold of narrative histories, but into a plurality of irregularly emerging and disappearing islands of discourse" (251). "Thus also excluded is the idea of reconciliation, a legacy of the philosophy of history on which

the critique of modernity stemming from Hegel still uninhibitedly nourished itself" (251). It "receives a harsh denunciation" (252). But it is only "from this destruction of a historiography that remains captive to anthropological thinking and basic humanistic convictions" that a new transcendental historiography can emerge (252).

"No place is left for any *overarching* meaning in this chaotic multitude of past totalities of discourse" (Habermas's italics, 253). "Under the *stoic* gaze of the archeologist, history hardens into an iceberg covered with the crystalline forms of arbitrary formations of discourses. . . . Under the *cynical gaze* of the genealogist, the iceberg begins to move" (Habermas's italics, 253). "The only thing that lasts is power, which appears with ever new masks in the change of anonymous processes of overpowering" (253). And thus "the danger of anthropocentrism is banished only when, under the incorrigible gaze of genealogy, discourses emerge and pop like glittering bubbles from a swamp of anonymous processes of subjugation" (268).

Foucault leaves behind structuralism because it "would not have meant a surpassing of modernity" (267). Part of this project is genealogy qua antiscience. "The name 'antiscience' is to be understood not only by opposition to the reigning human sciences; at the same time it signals an ambitious attempt to overcome these pseudo-sciences. Genealogical research takes their place" (275). As Paul Veyne says: "Everything is historical . . . and all 'isms' should be evacuated" (275). So genealogy "follows the movement of a radically historicist extinction of the subject . . ." (276).

"So he will [also] trace back the prohibition of gladiatorial fights in late Rome, for example, not to the humanizing influence of Christianity, but to the dissolution of one power formation by its successor. . . . The speeches that justify establishing or dismantling gladiatorial fights are regarded only as objectifications of an unconscious, underlying practice of domination. As the source of all meaning, such practices are themselves meaningless" (277).

"It is not Foucault's intention to continue that counter-discourse which modernity has carried on with itself from its very beginnings; he does not want to refine the language game of modern political theory (with its basic concepts of autonomy and heteronomy, morality and legality, emancipation and repression) and turn it against the pathologies of modernity – he wants to undermine modernity and its language games" (283).

"Genealogical historiography deals with an object domain from which the theory of power has erased all traces of communicative actions entangled in lifeworld contexts" (286). "If one admits only the model of empowerment, the socializing of succeeding generations can also be presented only in the image of wily confrontations" (287).

The rhetorical assault on Foucault's ***integrity****:* When discussing boundary-transgressing experiences in *Madness and Civilization*, Foucault omits Romanticism from [his] list, aside from one mention of Hölderin" (270). And, later, when he recognizes "the methodological problem of how a history of the constellations of reason and madness can be written at all . . . he poses himself this question without answering it" (247). Moreover, "Foucault does not allow himself to be influenced by the ostensible lack of coercion of the cogent argument by which truth claims, and validity claims in general, prevail" (247). But what must really be held against him is "the *concealed* derivation of the concept of the will to knowledge (originally formulated in terms of a critique of metaphysics . . ." (Habermas's italics, 270). And "of course, Foucault's dramatic influence and his iconoclastic reputation could hardly be explained if the cool facade of radical historicism did not simply hide the passions of aesthetic modernism" (275).

When Foucault becomes "aware of the aporias raised by a procedure that wants to be objectivistic but must remain diagnostic of its time . . . he does not provide any answer to them" (278). "Foucault sees this dilemma, but once again he evades any response" (281). "Once, in a lecture, Foucault addressed the question [of genealogy's own normative standards] in passing and gave a vague suggestion of postmodern criteria of justification" (284). In this lecture, he speaks about an antidisciplinarian type of right. "Now it is a fact that, in the wake of Kant, conceptions of morality and right have been developed which have long since ceased to serve the role of justifying the sovereignty of a state with a monopoly on violence; but Foucault remains silent on this theme" (284). It is evident that "if Foucault's concept of power preserves for itself some remnant of aesthetic content [derived from the aesthetic avant-garde from Baudelaire to the Surrealists], then it owes this to his vitalistic *Lebensphilosophie* way of reading the body's experience of itself" (285). Foucault tells us that "we have to dream . . . [about] another economy of bodies and pleasures . . ." (285). "This *other* economy of the body and of the pleasures, about which in the meantime – with Bataille – we can only dream, would . . . [presumably be] a postmodern theory that would also give an account of the standards of critique already laid claim to implicitly" (285). "But Foucault cannot, of course, make this interpretation [i.e., the vitalistic *Lebensphilosophie* one] his own . . ." (286). And "because Foucault cannot accept this notion from *Lebensphilosophie*, he has likewise to refrain from responding to the question about the normative foundations of his critique" (286).

When confronted with the complex phenomenon of the modern individual, Foucault deals with the related socializing processes in such a way that they "have to be artificially reinterpreted to make up for the categorial poverty of the empowerment model" (287). "Just like Gehlen, Foucault compensates for [the] bottleneck in his basic concepts by purifying the

concept of individuation of all connotations of self-determination and self-realization . . .” (287).

“Foucault could, of course, turn back objections of this kind as *petitio principii*. . . . We could only answer [to the contrary] if what looks to us like a basic conceptual deficiency were also to affect the design and execution of empirical investigations and thus could be pinned down to specific readings and blindspots” (288). For example, “Foucault can illustrate this thesis [i.e., the rise of modern disciplinary power] with impressive cases; nevertheless, the thesis is false in its generality” (288). It involves a “reduction [which] is enacted in several steps” (289). With respect to the rise of disciplinary power, “Foucault *begins* by analysing . . . [the early classical construal of law, but] *then* describes the advances . . . [culminating], on the one hand, in the Kantian theory of morality and, on the other hand, in utilitarianism. Interestingly enough, Foucault does not go into the fact that these in turn serve [the formation of the modern legal and political order]” (289). And “because Foucault filters out the internal aspects of the development of law, he can inconspicuously take a *third* and decisive step” (289). Disciplinary power, that is, is shown to be incompatible with and even impinging on the contractual form of law. “However, this circumstance [i.e., that Foucault’s construal is, to some extent, borne out] cannot justify the strategic decision (so full of consequences for Foucault’s theory) to neglect the development of normative structures in connection with the modern formation of power. As soon as Foucault takes up the threads [of one matter], he [conveniently] lets drop the threads [of another]” (290). “Because of this, [an] ungrounded impression arises . . .” (290).

“This uncircumspect levelling of culture and politics to immediate substrates of the applications of violence explains the ostensible gaps in his presentation” (290). His “theoretical levelling down to the system of *carrying out* punishment is [even] more questionable” than his detaching penal justice from the development of the constitutional state. “As soon as he passes from the classical to the modern age, Foucault pays no attention whatsoever to penal *law* and to the *law* governing penal process. Otherwise, he would have had to admit the unmistakable gains [in these areas]” (Habermas’s italics, 290). Thus “ his presentation is utterly distorted by the fact that he also filters out of the history of penal practices itself all aspects of legal regulation” (290).

“This same tendency towards a levelling of ambiguous phenomena can be seen in Foucault’s history of modern sexuality” (291). Indeed, “one could show in detail how Foucault simplifies the highly complex process of a progressive problematization of internal nature into a linear history. In our context, however, what is primarily of interest is the peculiar filtering out [of humanistic aspects]” (292). “C. Honnegar warns against . . . suppressing once again the repressions of the past” (292).

With respect to Kelly's defence of Foucault, there is, as we should expect, a minimal effort to derail Habermas's critical attack by a counter-critical disparaging of it. What slighting of it there is comes in the form of a questioning, sometimes ironic attack on Habermas's specific (or not so specific) standard on universals.[29] More important than this fact, however, is that it operates as a tactical complement to the implicit honouring of Foucault's thought. Proof of the latter lies largely in the fact that, over the course of twenty-seven pages, Kelly's essay relies on over forty quotations from Foucault's writings and interviews.[30] Since it would be a tedious affair to look at even a portion of these quotations wherein, as Kelly puts it on one occasion, "Foucault's position is best expressed . . ." (**CP**, 378), let us limit ourselves to a few observations.

Kelly's essay properly begins with an epigraph wherein Habermas tells us that "we must not limit our critique of relationships of power to those institutions in which power is overtly declared . . . We must extend it to the areas of life in which power is hidden behind the amiable countenance of cultural familiarity" (365). Tactically speaking, this epigraph can do the following. It can suggest 1) that Habermas is closer to Foucault than he realizes; 2) that, after coming into contact with Foucault's thought, Habermas has covertly appropriated it; and/or 3) that Habermas is confused or uncertain about his own position on power. A few paragraphs later, Kelly introduces a second Habermasian epigraph: "I met Foucault only in 1983, and perhaps I did not understand him well" (366). It is immediately followed by Kelly's informing us that "Habermas's critique of Foucault is largely based on a single text. . . ." (366). A single text and, moreover, "a particular interpretation of that text" (366). In other words, before Kelly has even presented a single argument to us, he manages to arouse the suspicion that Habermas's substantial critique is an essentially soft, blurry, and over-determined one. From this point on, Kelly need only continuously relate Habermas on *Discipline and Punish* to Foucault on *Discipline and Punish* (and related matters).[31] The former certainly does not get the same number of

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29 "The presuppositions of modernity are historical in origin, our reconstructions of them are fallible, yet their validity is transcendent. This is also true of modernity as a whole; although it arose only a few hundred years ago, it is not merely one of many historical traditions which we can voluntarily adopt or discard; modernity, too, is universal and thus irreversible, intractable, unavoidable.

"How could we modernists ever know whether there are principles whose significance is universal, especially since 'universal significance' here seems to mean 'significance beyond modernity' even when it is applied to modernity itself? How could we possibly justify such universality?" (*Critique and Power*, 388).

30 Kelly's extensive notes at the end of his essay cite all the material to which he avails himself (*Critique and Power*, 391-400).

31 Kelly concerns himself not only with the concept of disciplinary power (central to *Discipline and Punish*), but also with the nature and purpose of genealogical analysis and

opportunities to speak for himself that the latter does. He must – most of the time, at any rate – allow Kelly to present his case. Moreover, whereas Foucault on *Discipline and Punish* is supplemented by (in addition to the contributions by other Foucauldians)[32] Jana Sawicki on Foucault (370, 374), Habermas must be content with his critical opponent as his only proxy. However, the latter, not only deferring in large measure to Foucault's textual authority, even goes so far as to detail a personal and professional project directly indebted to it.[33] Therefore we can see that, as in the case of Habermas, much more is at work here than mere argumentation. *First*: A large number of strategic decisions guaranteeing arguments either of one kind or another. Logical force does not lead to these decisions but follows them. *Second*: A large number of tactical decisions right down to the choice of words which form a prejudice always running in favour of these arguments. Whatever is contrary is most often, at least in the case of polemical engagement, another tactic, that is, the one of honouring the opponent so that there is the appearance of being thoroughly just and objective.[34]

Does Dominque Janicaud, by going "straight to the heart of the matter" (**MF**, 292) or to the "bottom of the misunderstanding" (293), avoid rhetorical tactics? One thing is certain: he repeats these two idioms (or something nearly the same) six times over the course of ten pages. Furthermore, he discusses within these ten pages the following: i) Habermas's charge of systematic ambiguity (286), ii) the appropriateness of Habermas's use of the term 'empirical' to describe the historical matter of Foucault's studies (286), iii) Habermas's three main criticisms of Foucault (which are related to the charge of systematic ambiguity (287-291), iv) a few weaknesses in Habermas's arguments (291), v) the more serious problem of Habermas's not understanding Nietzsche (292), vi) Habermas's virtual caricaturing of Nietzsche (294), and vii) Habermas's imputing to Foucault a complete theory of power (293). The next five pages, the remainder of his essay, cover the following: i) Foucault's indirect approach to various subjects (295), ii) power's way of eluding the grasp of theory (296), iii) the different and broadening perspective of archeology/genealogy (297), iv) the problem for modernity of constructing a suitable theory of power (297), v) Nietzsche's singular contribution (297), vi) the question of the

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critique. He draws on, for example, the lectures and interviews in Foucault's *Power/Knowledge.*

32 Other contributions include remarks by Arnold Davidson (372) and Ian Hacking (382).

33 "Let us take the case of the birth in 1979 of the speciality of emergency medicine in the United States, which Dr. Richard Sanchez and I have analyzed elsewhere" (380). Kelly then discusses its genealogical orientation and relates it to Foucault's ***The Birth of the Clinic***, trans. A.M. Sheridan Smith (New York: Pantheon, 1973).

34 See the end of this section which deals with tactical reverses within rhetorical assaults.

efficacity of Habermas's theory of communicative action (298), vii) imperfections in Foucault's theory of power (298), viii) Habermas's charge of "vitalism" against Foucault (299), ix) modernity's need for a mixture of rationality and genealogy (299), x) the question of Habermas's genealogy of modern consciousness in its relation to the theory of communicative action (299), xi) Foucault's treatment of sexuality (299), and xii) the importance of reason's being always its own best critic (299). Two main motifs run through all the above: the importance of the issue of modern power in which Nietzsche and Foucault eminently involve themselves, and Habermas's wholly inadequate response to Nietzsche and Foucault and, hence, to this issue. Since the first motif already finds some expression in this study, let us concentrate only on the second.

*The rhetorical assault on the **adequacy** of Habermas' s response to Nietzsche and Foucault:* Habermas's "critique [of Foucault] proceeds with a mixture of sympathy and irritation (in which the second finally wins out . . ." (286). Let us note that he "is *redoubling* the critical effort which Foucault has already directed at his own work . . . He wants to enforce this criticism even more radically – so radically that a *different* theory seems finally to impose itself" (Janicaud's italics, 286). Once again, "Habermas does not confess that the source of [his] criticisms is often Foucault himself. . . . Is it not up to Habermas to explain and make clear the extent to which he appropriates Foucault's methodological lucidity (even for his self-criticism) and what it is that gives him the right to turn this against Foucault himself?" (292).

"From Habermas's point of view, it is fair game (and here he uses the most classical form of refutation) to show that Foucault does not succeed in his own enterprise, that he is caught up in his own trap" (290). So it is that "historicism . . . [according to this construal] has to confess its origin; and argumentation – in the philosophical crisis – rediscovers all its rights, thus profiting a new theory: that of the intersubjective communication professed by Habermas" (291).

But there are "a few weak points in Habermas's own criticisms" (291). He "seems to confuse two processes" (291). And "the two other criticisms [i.e., relativism and crypto-normativism] are largely redundant" (291). Moreover, "the *ad hominem* arguments interfere with the methodological criticisms" (291). "Yet there is a more serious problem" (292). "[The] pseudo-resume of Nietzsche's thought shows that Habermas *does not understand* Nietzsche . . ." (Janicaud's italics, 292). But [we may well ask] what is being refuted? Nietzsche or his shadow? Foucault or his caricature?" (293). "In Habermas there is nothing (or almost nothing) about [the] hermeneutic contribution of Nietzschean genealogy, at least in the book I am dealing with. The chapter on Nietzsche in *Der Philosophische Discurs der Moderne* is to say the least schematic, if not caricaturing" (294). So " it is

not surprising . . . that we get a distorted view of Foucault from Habermas's criticism" (294).

Let us end this section by briefly examining the rhetorical tactics which aim at taking the worst sting out of what otherwise might be put down as mere mean-spiritedness, professional jealousy, or even philosophical "protectionism." The interesting thing here is how a few choice remarks paying respect to an opponent manage to carry weight against the vast number showing disrespect.

Habermas's tactical reverses vis-a-vis his rhetorical assault on Foucault: "Were one to believe it possible to reduce his central ideas to the [biographical] context, one would surely be underestimating Foucault's originality" (**PDM**, 257). And as far as the impressive book, *The Order of Things* goes, we can say that "the internal motivations behind the transition to a theory of power can be understood in connection with the difficulties that emerged from this ingenious study itself" (258). Finally, although much can be said against Foucault's selectivity vis-a-vis historical matters, "this selectivity does not take anything away from the importance of his fascinating unmasking of the capillary effects of power" (291).

Janicaud's tactical reverses vis-a-vis his rhetorical assault on Habermas: "Habermas is the one contemporary philosopher who in the recent past has taken up the question [i.e., the rationality of power] in an extremely methodological way . . ." (**MF**, 285). And as far as his "crypto-normativistic" critique of Foucault goes, it "seems to be quite a classical move[. B]ut the originality of Habermas's criticism lies in the way he traces this choice process (and the negation of this choice) back to Foucault's process of genealogical history" (289). Moreover, it must be credited to Habermas that "the edification of a complex, non-functionalist theory of communication is a worthy enterprise . . ." (298). It is true, therefore, that "Foucault and Habermas bear witness, each in his own way, to the difficulty of dealing with the double demands of genealogy and rationality" (299). So "rather than continuing this criticism [of Habermas], I should like to end this contribution in a more measured way. Even if he did not recognize the full scope of Nietzsche's, Foucault's and Heidegger's hermeneutics, Habermas himself did after all sketch a genealogy of modern consciousness in *Der Philosophische Discurs der Moderne* . . ." (299).

Section II: Taylor contra Foucault / Connelly contra Taylor

Few critical attackers contextualize their opponent's thought beyond the depth and degree to which Habermas does. If they do, they are polemicists of such an order that, like Foucault, they no longer resemble, at least in the ordinary way, polemicists. Habermas, like Charles Taylor in a less open fashion, considers Foucault's opponent to be nothing less than the whole of modernity. Foucault responds that he is neither for nor against the latter (or, as he refers to it, the Enlightenment), but rather with it insofar as it is the self-critical attitude of the last two hundred years.[35] Foucault no doubt is right but, with a slight shift of emphasis, so are Habermas and Taylor. For to be radically self-critical – to push this kind of criticism to its absolute limit – is to go down a path which, with a Bunyanesque turn of phrase, we might describe as The Path of Philosophical Despondency. Taylor himself uses the term *disconcerting* to describe the effect on him – perhaps the general effect – of Foucault's thought. The first sentence of his essay entitled "Foucault on Freedom and Truth" is: "Foucault disconcerts" (**Foucault: A Critical Reader**, 69). Perhaps if he were more candid, he would say that Foucault frightens or threatens. After all, if we were to give up existentially what Foucault only gives up formally (i.e., the universal as absolute necessity), then the last bit of divinity left to us would surely flee (or be the fleeing itself of) the presence of rational being.

As we observed in Section I, strategy in polemical engagement is essentially the contextualizing and counter-contextualizing – really, the *recontextualizing* – of the opponent's thought. In this fashion, it falls under the jurisdiction of principles and values against which it must appear to range itself as a hostile, alien, and even mortally threatening force. What Taylor finds directly at hand to set up this jurisdiction is the traditional way of critiquing the past.

> Certain of Foucault's most interesting analyses, while they are highly original, seem to lie along already familiar lines of thought. That is, they seem to offer an insight into what has happened and into what we have become, which at the same time offers a critique and hence some notion of a good unrealized or repressed in history, which we therefore understand better now how to rescue (**FCR**, 69).

Within these few lines is the clearly traditional notion of modern critique. It is the moderate critique of modernity itself as well as the "rational" critique

35 Foucault, *Foucault: A Critical Reader*, 42.

of everything showing itself to be anti-Enlightenment, anti-progressive, anti-humanitarian – in a word, anti-modern. With a few deft strokes, Taylor brings before us the whole basis of his essay, the honoured homeland, in other words, that must be protected at all costs.

Strategy, being strategy, becomes methodology.

> For the sake of my discussion, I want to isolate three lines of analysis, each of which suggests, or is historically connected with, a certain line of critique . . . (70).

Ostensibly these lines of analysis with their related lines of critique are present in "Foucault's recent historical works, *Surveiller et Punir* and *Histoire de la sexualité*" (70).[36] In other words, the connections between these particular lines of analysis and lines of critique, even though they be merely "suggestive" or "historical," presumably belong to the work of Foucault himself. Strategically speaking, what Taylor does is move from the impression he originally receives from Foucault's analyses, i.e., that they "seem to lie along already familiar lines of thought" and offer a critique related to some notion of the good, to presenting this impression as the actual form of these analyses. Now the latter, being implicated in "the already familiar lines of thought," must answer to them.

> . . . I have ordered these analyses so that the argument arising from them moves towards more radical repudiations. That is, at first sight, the second analysis will seem to offer a reason for repudiating the good suggested by the first; and the third analysis will seem to offer a reason for rejecting the good implicit in the second; only to be in turn rejected (70).

Though Taylor specifies that he orders the analyses, the analyses themselves, as well as "the argument arising from them," all become attributed to Foucault. The seeming repudiation of the good suggested by the second and third analyses, being related to Taylor's ordering of them, dwells somewhere in the middle.

It is in this manner that Taylor, rather than, as Habermas does, portraying Foucault as the virtually self-professed enemy of modernity,[37]

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36 See notes 19 and 26.

37 Nancy Fraser states the following: "In a recent discussion of postmodernism, Jürgen Habermas referred to Michel Foucault as a 'young conservative.' The epithet was an allusion to the 'conservative reactionaries' of interwar Weimar Germany . . . To call Foucault a 'young conservative,' then, was to accuse him of elaborating what Habermas calls 'a total critique of modernity.' Such a critique, according to Habermas, is both theoretically paradoxical and

shows him to be the more or less unselfconscious one. Referring everything to a notion of the good, to a notion, moreover, which universalizes the good qua humanitarian and progressive values of modern society, Taylor's critical analysis of Foucault's analyses becomes the study of the successive repudiation of these humanitarian and progressive values. By never expressly stating the universalizing factor, Taylor can deposit it surreptitiously in Foucault's thought as the operative principle which both confounds and is confounded by the particular analyses and their related critiques. Instead of a logical basis, in other words, for historicizing or relativizing universals within the framework of his analyses, Foucault ends up with the illogicality of historicizing or relativizing the very universal which directs and provides meaning for these analyses.

As we observed right from the outset of this study, insistence on the universal by the critical attackers of Foucault immediately incites insistence on the particular by the critical defenders.

> But I also contend, first, that the translation of Foucauldian rhetoric into Tayloresque formulations obscures distinctive features of Foucault's thought . . . (**Political Theory**, 365).

Such are the first words of protest by William Connelly against Taylor's contextualizing and infiltrating operation. Naturally enough, elaboration upon the above-mentioned "distinctive features" forms the reverse strategy. Instead of the progressive, humanitarian tradition being the poorly treated (even betrayed) secret heart of the Foucault corpus, Connelly returns this corpus to its place "outside" this tradition.

> Foucault adopts two interlocking strategies to support this claim [i.e., that there is more to being than knowing]. First, there is, as in the chapter in *The Order of Things* entitled "Man and his Doubles," an archeological account of how modern understandings of finitude – of life, labour, and language – eventually call transcendental and teleological perspectives into question from within" (**PT**, 366). [Secondly], he proceeds . . . as a genealogist, deploying rhetorical devices to incite the experience of discord or discrepancy between the social construction of self, truth, and rationality and that which does not fit neatly within their folds. And the recurrent experience of discord eventually shakes the self loose from a quest for a

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politically suspect" ("Michel Foucault: A Young Conservative?," in *Critique and Power*, 185).

> world of harmonization . . . (368).

Foucault's thought, as we have said, returns to its place outside the tradition. And yet not quite outside it. For though it formally leaves the universal behind in its genealogical investigation of history, it practically returns to it in the form of genealogically-based critique.

> [What is this world of harmonization? It is] a world in which the institutional possibilities for personal identity harmonize with a unified set of potentialities in the self, and the realization of unity in the self harmonizes with the social good realized by the social order. This quest for identity through institutional identification becomes redefined as the dangerous extension of "disciplinary society" into new corners of modern life (360).

Does not the word *dangerous* here simply replace, to no great effect, the word *bad* or *evil*? If such is the case, then there must be an implicit appeal to some social good, to some universal. Perhaps we may call it the already mentioned *rerum concordia discors.* In other words, we end up coming back to a world of harmonization, although the latter now includes, in a very positive way, discord, perhaps even danger (i.e., evil). The danger of having no danger, of being totally harmonized or homogenized, requires particular endangerments. Genealogy, perhaps, is one of these.

But the paradoxical, anti-philosophical, and anarchistic drift of this discourse requires that Connelly, following Foucault here, particularize the evaluative content of genealogical critique. It cannot involve an explicit appeal to some absolute or universal way of being (though it likely harbours an implicit or ironic one), but must rather be the operative values of modernity concretely (i.e., practically) engaged in perpetual acts of self-scrutiny. Hence "genealogy is not a claim to truth (although it functions in an episteme in which established theories of truth are called into question); it exercises a claim upon the self that unsettles the urge to give hegemony to the will to truth" (368).

Perhaps it desires to be no more (and no less) than an understated scepticism writ large. It can no longer believe in modernity or the past's connection to it in the way Habermas and Taylor do, nor can it quite stop believing in them. So far as it is not a turning away and remains critical, it is, in fact, the refinement of modernity's defining intellectual sensibility. Critique, that is, not just as an industrious, systematic, sharp-toothed way of thinking through everything, but as a way of living – a way of learning to live – with the consequences of such rapacity and the scarce resources that, philosophically speaking, threaten to confront it.

Connelly certainly moves along this path (we might even say this warpath) when he problematizes Taylor's critical or sceptical (hence *reverential*) halt before the progressive, humanitarian values of the modern age. The tactic Connelly employs here is to bring into agreement virtually all the main points of Taylor's and Foucault's thought except one[38] – Taylor's view of an essentially benevolent world to which individuals may better attune themselves.

> [Taylor] seeks to transcend the illusion of the sovereign self . . . by striving to articulate for us those elements in the self and its circumstances that come closest to expressing what we are at our best. The most expressive articulations are not simply the creation of subjects, nor do they represent what is true in itself independently of human articulation: "They rather have the power to move us because they manifest our expressive power itself and its relation to our world. In this kind of experience we are responding to the way things are, rather just exteriorizing our feelings" (367).

Strategically speaking, what we have here is the beginning of Connelly's problematizing of the contextualization of Foucault's thought by Taylor which is only implicit in the latter's key statement (i.e., that Foucault's thought seems to lie along already familiar lines of thought). Connelly's critical defence, in other words, involves unmasking the seeming straightforwardness and simplicity of Taylor's starting point. Moreover, it is also a counterattack which, although it employs more decorous language that does Janicaud's against Habermas, exceeds the latter by going straight to the heart of his opponent's philosophical homeland.

This counterattack actually takes up a significant portion of Connelly's eleven-page essay. It begins with the statement that "once this obscurity is lifted [i.e., the Tayloresque formulations of Foucault's thought], the success of Taylor's critique will depend less on the claim that the theory is 'ultimately incoherent' and more on Taylor's ability to defend his own affirmations from Foucauldian decomposition" (365). Thereupon, Connelly wastes little time insisting on this lack of ability.

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38 Connelly lists seven points of commonality: i) the epistemic limitations on discourse and thought, ii) the inadequacy of the correspondence theory of truth, iii) the eclipse of the pre-modern metaphysical and religious beliefs, iv) the priority of being over knowing, v) the pre-discursive depth of language, vi) the denial of the Cartesian subject, and vii) the threat to foundations by the "death of God" (*Political Theory*, 367).

> Taylor, finding himself unable to prove his most fundamental assumptions to be true, seeks to draw us closer to the experience of attunement . . . (362).

The third phase of his attack is to demonstrate "Foucauldian decomposition."

> The Foucauldian rhetorical strategy works, for instance, through the displacement of the unifying or mellow metaphors governing Taylor's texts by more disturbing ones . . . These strategies are designed, I believe, simultaneously to *express* a view of the relation between social form and the material from which it is constructed at odds with that accepted by Taylor [and] to *express* the subterranean role played by rhetorical configurations in texts by writers such as Taylor in gaining assent to their most fundamental convictions . . . (368).

The fourth phase is to call into question the very heart of Taylor's thought.

> Foucault's theory of power and subjectification is part of his assault on the teleological philosophies that continue to find disguised expression in the modern age. The theory of the essentially embodied subject, for instance, is a theory of self-realization that treats the self as if it were designed to fulfill its potentiality through perfecting its subjectivity; and to reject the residual teleological premise inside that hope is to see the subject as an artificial reality imposed on material not designed to receive it (371).

The fifth phase is to present Taylor with a set of questions "to encourage [him] to articulate more affirmatively what shifts, if any, seem to him to be required in his theories of truth, freedom, order, and personal identity after engaging [Foucault's] texts" (367).[39]

No doubt a good anti-Foucauldian strategist would ignore questions which, as in the case of Connelly's, presuppose the full legitimacy and power of Foucault's counter-discourse.[40] If he were Taylor, no doubt he would

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39 These questions amount to the following: i) How can Taylor, given what he holds in common with Foucault, presume to shuffle him aside?; ii) Would Taylor be willing to make changes, in the face of Foucault's challenge, to his own theory of identity?; and iii) To what extent is his theory committed "to the sort of teleological philosophy Foucault's genealogies are designed to hunt down and destroy?" (*Political Theory*, 375).

40 Taylor formally responds to Connelly's questions in his rebuttal essay, "Connelly Foucault,

continue to insist that, when all is said and done, Foucault "dashes the hope that . . . there is some good that we can *affirm*" (Taylor's italics) (**FCR**, 69) and, in so doing, shows that his "position is ultimately incoherent . . ." (83). The means by which Taylor demonstrates this incoherence is, first, to examine the seeming affirmation of a good (i.e., the rise of modern humanitarianism) which comes out of one line of Foucault's analysis (71-73) and the subsequent critique (i.e., modernity as a new system of domination) which seems to repudiate this good (73-74). Thereupon, there follows the examination of a second line of analysis which, in turn, seems to affirm a good (i.e., the critique of modernity's reliance on instrumental reason) which a subsequent critique (i.e., the indivisibility of this reason from all aspects of modernity) again seems to repudiate (77). Finally, the examination of a third line of analysis reveals that a seeming good, "the ideology of expressive liberation, particularly in connection with sexual life, is itself just a strategy of power" (80). "And so," as Taylor notes, "we come to the bottom line" (80).

> What about the evaluation which seems to flow from the third analysis? This would offer us some idea of a liberation but not via the correct or authentic expression of our natures. It would be a liberation from the whole ideology of such expression, and hence from the mechanisms of control which use this ideology. It would be a liberation which was helped by our unmasking falsehood; a liberation aided by the truth (80).

The strategic but, as it now seems to become, purely argumentative line is one of insisting on a clear explanation as to how the concept of liberation can still be of service when the ideology of liberation itself no longer serves. The patent incoherency, in other words, is such that Taylor becomes "less interested in hammering this line of critique than in seeing what can be coherently said in this area" (83).

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and Truth" (*Political Theory*, August, 1985, 377-385). The first thing he does is to sidestep the issue of genealogy as a counter-discourse which must renounce grounding itself in universal principles. He asks: "Are they (i.e., Foucault's works) not put forward as true?" (378). Beyond posing this question, he offers little except a reworking of the arguments (i.e., a redeploying of the strategy) of his earlier essay. Instead of responding directly to Connelly's questions, that is, he simply renews his attack on Foucault. To give some idea of this attack, let us point out that, at least a dozen times, he makes passing reference to Foucault's (while ignoring his own) use of rhetoric. Such comments as "[r]hetorical hijinks come just where we should be deploying the most responsible arguments" (381) do not do seem to be fair nor judicious.

Towards the end of his essay, he returns to Connelly's questions but with mainly the objective of clearing himself from the possible charge of holding "a full-scale Hegelian theory or . . . a Platonic vision of the universe . . ." (385).

> I think Foucault's position is ultimately incoherent, but that this escapes detection because the points where it falls into contradiction are misidentified as new and deeper formulations of what many would recognize as valuable insights (83).

It is on the above note that Taylor begins his problematizing of Foucault's thought qua theory of power which, though similar to Habermas's in many respects,[41] places special emphasis on the presumed loss of subjectivity.[42]

As noted in the Introduction, the critical attackers of Foucault, sensing that his weakness lies somewhere in the theoretical realm, undertake to examine his theory apart from the specific historiographical work it does. Thus, instead of finding no more that working hypotheses which aim to explain in greater and better detail some area of past social life, they discover the outlines and intentions of a global, systematic, philosophical enterprise. Accordingly, they demand (and here they inevitably seize on Foucault's analytic of power) that it, first, exhibit a rigorously logical design and, second, provide a total account of social and institutional phenomena. It is not surprising, therefore, that this universalizing or "de-circumscribing" of Foucault's thought provides ample critical opportunities.

In keeping with his key statement (i.e., that Foucault's analyses seem to lie along already familiar lines of thought) as well as deploying that part of strategy, already evidenced by Habermas, which amounts to integrating the opponent's line of thought with already familiar ones,[43] Taylor more or less shows his agreement with two Foucauldian theses: i) power is not essentially centralized but rather universally exercised (84); and ii) power relations at the micro-level concatenate to form large-scale social operations or strategies (85). But there is a "third thesis which [according to Taylor] makes no sense . . ." (86). It is the one of large-scale strategies both incommensurate with and disconnected from the purposes and desires of individual agents. After giving examples of incommensurate but logically or empirically connected levels of strategy and levels of purposeful agents (86-87), Taylor states the following:

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41 For example, Taylor's discussion of the problematic relation between strategies of large-scale social operations and power effects at the micro-level (*Foucault: A Critical Reader*, 86-88) finds its counterpart in Habermas's problematizing the relationship between the "transcendental" and the "empirical" in Foucault's thought (*Philosophical Discourse*, 256, 270-274).

42 While Habermas responds to what he views as Foucault's threat to rationality, Taylor concerns himself with his seeming negation of the individual will (*Critical Reader*, 92).

43 See pages 25 to 26 for the profiling of this integration at the rhetorical level.

> I am citing these types and examples to illustrate my main point, which is that purposefulness without purpose requires a certain kind of explanation to be intelligible. The undesigned systematicity has to be related to the purposeful action of agents in a way that we can understand (87).

After discussing the logical difficulties of Foucault's second thesis in relation to supplying a connection between strategies and agents (88), Taylor concludes that "in order to stick by the second thesis . . . we would need some account . . . where micro-reactions concatenate in [a] systematic way" (88). In other words, what Foucault needs is a systematic account of power relations in their constitution of all social and institutional phenomena (i.e., a global theory).

After demonstrating how Foucault's theory of power falls short as a logical, systematic effort, Taylor goes on to show how it semantically truncates the concept of power in order to give power the semblance of a universal principle. Here he resembles Habermas in insisting that this concept must have a subjective reference.[44] "'Power', [in other words, can only belong to] a semantic field from which 'truth' and 'freedom' cannot be excluded" (91). "But that is not Foucault's point," Taylor insists. "He wants to discredit as somehow based on a misunderstanding the very idea of liberation from power" (92).

Just as Kelly and Janicaud respond to Habermas's universalizing reconstruction and problematization with a particularizing *counter*-reconstruction and *de*problematization,[45] so Connelly responds to Taylor's when he states that the latter "attributes an intention to Foucault that is not his" (**PT**, 370).

> Foucault does not seek to offer complete explanations because he knows that such an objective will draw him back into the discourse he seeks to unsettle; because he knows that in the modern episteme a coherent explanation will presuppose the very conceptions of truth

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44 "In his basic concept of power, Foucault has forced together the idealist idea of transcendental synthesis with the presuppositions of an empirical ontology. This approach cannot lead to a way out of the philosophy of the subject, because the concept of power that is supposed to provide a common denominator for the contrary semantic components has been taken from the repertoire of the philosophy of the subject itself" (*Philosophical Discourse*, 274).

45 Here the reference, of course, is to the main tendency (as opposed to the universalistic counter-tendencies) of Kelly's and Janicaud's critical defences. The main tendency is the formal and practical commitment to the meta- or para-theoretical role of genealogy.

and subjectivity he wishes to question (370).

The implicit appeal here to special consideration is similar to Nietzsche's cry in *Ecce Homo*: "I am myself. Do not mistake me for another." The particularist, in other words, identifies primarily with the good in the particular. The universalist, by contrast, identifies with the good in the universal. The latter cannot simply extend his full appreciation, polemically speaking, to the former. Thus Connelly (a particularist) bewails the fact that Taylor (a universalist) "has not really tried, first of all, to ascertain what stand Foucault adopts . . . and, then, to ask whether such a stance can be sustained as a viable counterpoint . . . He merely assumes," Connelly continues, "that Foucault intends to offer explanations contesting those that now have hegemony, and then he shows that if Foucault's texts do embody such intentions, they do not live up to the standards of good or coherent explanations" (370).

In simplest terms, the Foucauldian fact that a complex of power relations produces the subject which in turn produces the subject's freedom is hostile not just to a fully coherent explanation in a more or less demarcated area, but to the claim that there is or can be any such thing as a fully coherent explanation.

> In modern discourse we witness "the interminable to and fro of a double system of reference: if man's knowledge is finite, it is because he is trapped, without possibility of liberation, within the positive content of language, labor, and life, and conversely, if life, labor, and language may be posited in their positivity, it is because knowledge has finite forms." In this setting every articulation of thought presupposes the unthought from which it draws nourishment and, conversely, that which nourishes thought must always escape full articulation (366).

However, the testimony here for an essentially ambiguous, paradoxical state of affairs cannot translate itself into a new state of affairs at the practical level, disqualifying the very values by which we now live and, without which, we cannot live. In other words, though Foucault's thought is hostile, it is not hegemonic. It can only exist as the countercurrent to the larger sweep of rational undertakings. And if it is efficacious on a large scale, it is so only as a kind of antitoxin for those poisons which too much certainty allow to accumulate in the body politic – those heady notions of a historico-cultural moral supremacy.

However, in Connelly's counter-strategy there is an elision of the question of incoherence and no doubt it is due to Taylor's employing the

"incoherent" charge as the central part of his critical attack. This elision comes about in three ways: i) a vigorous counterattack which is virtually a return of the charge;[46] ii) an emphasis on archeological studies and genealogical critiques as counter-discourse;[47] and iii) the reification or localization of the other of thought as "recalcitrant material in an embodied self resistant" to the form power imposes on it (371). With respect to the last, Connelly effects a break between the power which constitutes the subject qua institutionally determined being and the hidden passions, instincts, or whatever which incline the self towards an opposite expression.[48] Freedom then gains a place outside of, yet connected to, power in a way which contradicts a crucial point of Taylor's critique, i.e., that Foucault's concept of power envelops and negates freedom. In effect then, what Connelly does is to counter-reconstruct the paradox of power in order to defuse Taylor's charge which, of course, relies on a particular critical reconstruction of the same.[49]

As already noted, Taylor establishes a link between two main impressions: the one of Foucault's being disconcerting and the one of his seeming to involve himself in traditional discourses. There is much evidence to show that Taylor dislikes being disconcerted. For the time being, however, let us examine the matter of his strategic appropriation of Foucault's thought which takes in the wholesome part of it, so to speak, and expels the rest. For Taylor, the former is principally the first two lines of analysis which portray a growing humanitarian spirit and then, insofar as modernity involves itself in new forms of domination, contest it. The unwholesome part of Foucault's thought is the third line of analysis wherein "the very notion of ourselves as having a true identity to express . . . [is] part of the *dispositif* of control, rather than . . . what defines our liberation" **(FCR**, 80). At this point, moral evaluations of the past, even seeming ones, cease. Taylor explains the situation as follows:

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46 "Taylor, I have charged, seeks to evade the pressure Foucault exerts on his own theory of the subject by convicting Foucauldian theory of incoherence" (*Political Theory*, 373).
47 "Foucault's thought at [the] archeological level does not seek to defeat an orientation such as Taylor's. Rather, it identifies the terrain upon which modern critics of epistemological foundationalism . . . compete with one another for hegemony" (*Political Theory*, 366-367).
48 "Power produces the subject that becomes not a mere fiction of theory and law, but a real artifact. The subject, on Foucault's reading is not 'dead': it is very much alive and very much the effect of modern disciplinary institutions. But if power produces the subject, in what ways does power constrain or limit the self? Subjectification, an effect of power, subjugates recalcitrant material in an embodied self resistant to this form. Power produces and constrains, then, but the target of constraint is not the self as agent, but that in selves which resists agentification" (*Political Theory*, 371).
49 The insuperable problem of the relationship between power and knowledge is the subject of Tom Keenan's essay. See note 80.

> I have been trying . . . to get to the point [by examining these three lines of analysis] where we can see the break in Foucault's thought, the point which disconcerts, where he adopts a Nietzschean-derived stance of neutrality between the different historical systems of power and thus seems to neutralize the evaluations which arise out of his analyses (79-80).

It is this desire for a "Nietzschean neutrality" which Taylor pinpoints as the source of Foucault's incoherence, i.e., his refusal to accept the possibility of a liberation from the power-produced truth which controls us by constituting our identity, purposes, desires, etc. (80). To articulate a return to coherence involving essential notions of truth, freedom, and personal identity therefore becomes an important part of Taylor's task. Since there is no way, as Connelly points out, that he can logically ground these notions, he must rely on, apart from attacking the opposing position, an implicit appeal to the authority of tradition and widespread consensus.

Submerged motifs or thematic lines, let us recall, can be either disparaging or honorific. They rely on a vast number of rhetorical tactics, often quite subtle, to produce a cumulative persuasive effect. For example, the fact that Taylor begins by strongly suggesting that Foucault follows the already beaten path of historical investigations simultaneously suggests the inevitability of the latter and the illusory or wayward aspect of, let us say, Foucault's beating his own path. In addition, he immediately ties Foucault both positively and negatively to what these "beaten paths," often quite explicitly, honour – the rise of modern society. Thus, an important part of Taylor's strategy, while examining and critiquing Foucault, is to remind us of this traditional homage. Let us, following the synoptical and citational approach of Section I, take a look at the above.

Taylor's rhetorical championing of the rise of modern (Western) society: Upon reading the opening scene of Foucault's book (i.e., *Discipline and Punish*) depicting a horrible eighteenth century execution, "the modern is appalled, horrified . . . Obviously something very big has changed in our whole understanding of ourselves, of crime and punishment" (71). "It is . . . that a new notion of the good has arisen. This is defined by what has often been called modern 'humanitarianism.' We have acquired . . . a concern for the preservation of life, for the fulfilling of human need, and above all the relief of human suffering . . ." (72). "What lies behind this . . . is a big and deep story. No one can claim to understand it fully. But I have to go into it a little . . ." (72). "I think one of the important factors . . . [is] what I want to call 'ordinary life'" (72). Since earliest times, highest ethics have increasingly formed it. "Think, for instance, of the growth of . . . companionate

marriage . . . the growing sense of the importance of the *emotional* fulfilment in marriage – indeed, the whole modern sense that one's *feelings* are a key to the good life" (Taylor's italics) (73). Thus "with the ethics of ordinary life arises the notion that serving life . . . is a paradigm goal in itself, while at the same time the supposed higher ends which previously trumped life . . . are progressively discredited" (73).

Biographical changes of outlook require personal identity. "Is there nothing comparable in politics/history? There is. . . . We have become certain things in Western civilization. Our humanitarianism, our notions of freedom . . . have helped to define a political identity we share . . ." (96). Moreover, "one of the reasons why we can no longer believe in [the old] kind of order is the advance in our civilization of a scientific understanding . . . which we have every reason to believe represents a significant gain of truth" (97). So it may be asked: "Can we really step outside the identity we have developed in Western civilization . . ?" (99).

Now it must be pointed out that, while Taylor provides critical commentary which is a counterweight to the above and which, at the same time, often involves paying lavish tribute to Foucault, this counterweight and tribute only amount to a fraction of the main perlocutionary effect. Moreover, praise of Foucault is often only that of the "wholesome" part of his thought, the first and second lines of analysis which, according to Taylor, he undertakes and which involve a seemingly more modest critique of modern forms of domination.

Taylor's rhetorical crediting of Foucault for his first two lines of analysis: "Obviously something very big has changed in our whole understanding of ourselves, of crime and punishment. Bringing us up against this evidence of radical historical discontinuity is what Foucault does superlatively well" (71). For example, he shows us how "the [old] punishments have a meaning [in their historical context.] I find Foucault convincing on this" (71). But the modern age is not without blemish. "In an immensely rich series of analyses, Foucault draws the portrait of a new power coming to be" (74). Out of all this, it may be said that "Foucault offers the Frankfurt school an account of the inner connection between the domination of nature and the domination of man which is rather more detailed and more convincing . . . It is the measure of the great richness of his work that this 'gift' is not at all part of his intentions" (77).

Other complimentary remarks surface periodically. But when measured against the amount of disparaging material, even the use of superlatives cannot make the former come close to being an absolution of the "rhetorically noted" sins of negativity, evasiveness, incoherency, and over-

simplification. Since we have already gone through the exercise of portraying Habermas's rhetorical assaults on Foucault's originality, positive contribution, and integrity, let us be content to examine Taylor's assault on Foucault's *subtlety*, *complexity*, and *coherency*.

Taylor's rhetorical assault on Foucault's subtlety and complexity: "Foucault's analyses are terribly one-sided" (81). "[His] attraction is partly that of a *terrible simplificateur*. His espousal of the reversal of Clausewitz's aphorism . . . leaves out everything in Western history which has been animated by civic humanism or analogous movements. Without this in one's conceptual armoury, Western histories and societies become incomprehensible . . ." (82-83).

"[And] then to understand [the modern preoccupation with sexuality] simply in terms of control leaves out its roots . . . in the Christian concern for the quality of the will . . . And to reduce the whole Western, post-Romantic business of trying to save oneself to an artifact of such a technology of control approaches absurdity" (83).

"Strategies without projects; this would be a good formula to describe Foucault's historiography" (86). "He leaves us with a strange kind of Schopenhauerian will, ungrounded in human action" (88). In other words, he needs to explain "the rise and fall of [discursive and practise-related] contexts in history . . . And that is the issue we are talking about with Foucault's system of modern technologies of control. How does it arise? Of *course* , you don't explain it by some big bad man/class designing it (who ever suggested anything so absurd?), but you do need to explain it . . ." (Taylor's italics) (89). For example, take the business of the reciprocal relation, overlooked by Foucault, between "structures of action or language" and "action/speech." "This is a crashing truism, but the fog emanating from Paris in recent decades makes it necessary to clutch it as a beacon in the darkness" (90).

Foucault implicitly discounts the possibility of liberation from power complexes "because of the fundamentally Nietzschean thesis which is basic to his work" (92). And he discounts the possibility of freedom within these complexes "because of his over-simple and global notion of modern systems of control and domination . . ." (92). In other words, "Foucault's Nietzschean theory can only be the basis for utterly monolithic analyses; which is what we [can see] in his failure to recognize the ambivalence of moral disciplines . . ." (94-95).

"The reality of history is mixed and messy. The problem is that Foucault tidies it up too much, makes it into a series of hermetically sealed, monolithic truth-regimes, a picture which is as far from reality as the blandest whig perspective of smoothly broadening freedom" (98).

"Foucault's monolithic relativism only seems plausible if one takes the

outsider's perspective, the view from Sirius . . ." (98).

Taylor's rhetorical assault on Foucault's coherency: Foucault repudiates the view that there is "some good we can affirm . . . This is rather paradoxical . . ." (69). "But can he do it? Does he really do it? What does it mean to do it? These are central questions which arise . . . And this is the right place to pose these questions . . . Does he really do it? Even this is not so clear. There are moments when some notion of liberation seems to peek through. Is it true(?) that he repudiates the notion of liberation through truth. But later there is the hint of a possible *point d'appui* for a relative freeing. . . . But the question I would like to explore here is: can he do it? By that I mean: what can be coherently said in this domain? Just how much sense does a Nietzschean position make?" (80-81).

"Is there confusion/contradiction here, or a genuinely original position?" (70). "I think Foucault's position is utterly incoherent . . ." (83). "It is this third thesis which makes no sense, in Foucault's version" (86). "One of the most important reasons why Foucault doesn't feel a need to offer an account here is the confusion which has afflicted the republic of letters during these last decades about the supposed "death of subjectivity" (89). "The Nietzschean programme on this level [where there is no place for freedom or truth] *does not make sense*" (Taylor's italics) (90). "To speak of power, and to want to deny a place to 'liberation' and 'truth,' as well as the link between them, is to speak incoherently" (93). "The position is easy enough to state baldly, but difficult – or impossible – actually to integrate into the logic of one's analytical discourse . . ." (94). "Just because some claims to truth are unacceptable, we do not need to blow the whole conception to pieces" (95). And although "the affinity with Nietzsche in the stress on self-making is very understandable . . . this in no way lessens the paradox . . ." (99).

"Perhaps Foucault was moving, before his sudden and premature death, to free his position from this paradox . . ." (99).

Of course, we make no attempt to deny that these quotational synopses are, in and of themselves, one-sided in their rhetorical effect. Nevertheless, the only difference between the rhetorical effect here (apart from the context of this study) and the actual one is the masking and legitimating tendency of certain assumptions, lines of argument, and other elements (including rhetorical ones).

Given that his essay is much shorter than Taylor's (eleven pages to the latter's thirty-one), Connelly repeatedly hits on the broad theme of Foucault's challenge to traditional discourses. In a manner similar to Janicaud's underlining the importance of raising the issue of modern power, it encloses a moral evaluation simultaneously favourable to Foucault and

hostile to his opponent. But to admit to this evaluation openly or to elaborate it philosophically would mean making explicit reference to a teleological or transcendent *point d'appui*, the very thing being formally repudiated. Consequently, the defence of Foucault's thought, as this thought itself, must endlessly circle about, evaluatively speaking, its pure *efficacity* in critiquing. But this kind of efficacity, formally recognized and licenced by the modern age (and, therefore, modern philosophy), cannot refrain from, in fulfilling its mandate, scrutinizing and shaking up the licensing body itself. There is nothing of logic here except the "teleological" instinct, drive, or imperative which brings, under propitious conditions, some acorns of activity to a higher, more intricate show of themselves.

Rhetorically then, the strategy of Connelly's defence is to imply (but not insist on) a certain moral ascendancy which comes with "Foucault's assault on these teleological philosophies that continue to find disguised expression in the modern age" (**PT**, 371). These seemingly less than straightforward philosophies involve "a quest for identity through institutional identification [which] becomes redefined [by genealogical critique] as the dangerous extension of 'disciplinary society' into new corners of modern life" (368). Since Taylor spends a fair portion of his essay valorizing the union between personal and social identity,[50] Connelly's counter-critique becomes a series of barbed references to the latter. We have, for example, the Tayloresque formulations of Foucault's thought (365), the inability to prove fundamental assumptions (367), the use of unifying or mellow metaphors (368), the rhetorical configurations in texts to gain assent to fundamental convictions (368), and the attempt to draw us "into endorsement and perfection of the identity now given us" (368). Furthermore, the "ontological thesis with political implications" which Connelly attributes to Foucault (365) and which he reiterates several times throughout his short essay (usually as resistance of the "is" to the "ought," content to form, or self to subjectification) finally spells out something which looks suspiciously humane and progressive (i.e., humanitarian).[51]

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50 "Central to the Romantic notion of liberation is the notion that the nature within us must come to expression. The wrong stance of reason is that of objectification, and the application of instrumental reason; the right stance is that which brings to authentic expression what we have within us. In accordance with the whole modern rehabilitation of ordinary life, of which the Romantic movement is heir, one of the crucial aspects of this inner nature which must be articulated is our nature as sexual beings. There is a truth of this: an authentic way for each of us to love" *(Critical Reader*, 77).

51 Certainly Taylor wastes no time construing it this way. In his rebuttal essay (see note 40) he states the following: "Connelly's second question concerns the theory of personal identification that follows from [his Foucauldian] critique. I could embrace as my own the one he offers to me, 'in which the goal is to integrate otherness into more perfect forms of identification with the will of a rational community.' This would seem to me the highest ideal" (*Political Theory*, 384).

> When we give up the residue of *telos* clinging to modern conceptions of the subject, we can adopt a different political stance to that which is other to subjectivity. We will see otherness to be less what mental instability, criminality, and perversity are in themselves and more what must be produced and contained if subjectivity is to be. If we understand the subject in this way, if we acknowledge that the subject is formed from material and predesigned to fit perfectly into this form, we are in a position to reconsider the politics of containment that now governs institutional orientations to otherness. We will not be able to conceive an order in which otherness is eliminated, but we may be able to appraise more adequately the debt subjectivity owes to it (374).

A prescription to be even more deeply just and receptive to otherness, perhaps even to – evil? It is a strange suspicion and a strange kind of "humanitarianism." Nevertheless, it does point to the fact that radical critique is not itself the overturning of present values, but the displacement (or shaking up, if you will) of the view that those social ones of highest acclaim really come close to – or perhaps ever can come close to – fulfilment.

Section III: Balbus contra Foucault / Sawicki contra Balbus

With this section the Foucauldian debate moves from a rather weak political reference to a "strong"[52] political contextualization. Isaac Balbus's opening paragraph prepares the ground for it and for what, at first glance, seems to be another hard-line strategy of critical attack.

> . . . I stage a confrontation between the genealogy of Michel Foucault and the feminist psychoanalytic theory of Dorothy Dinnerstein, Nancy Chodorow, Jane Flax, and myself. I am obliged to resort to this artifice because – as far as I am aware – none of the parties to this confrontation has ever before addressed the position of the other: feminist psychoanalytic theorists have yet to make the discourse of Foucault the object of their critique of masculine discourse as a simultaneous reaction to and denial of the power of the mother, and neither Foucault nor his followers have extended their deconstruction of the disingenuous discourse of the true to the theorists of mothering. This confrontation is by no means arbitrary, however, because we shall see that the discourse of the mother looks like a paradigm case of what Foucault would call a "disciplinary true discourse," while from a feminist psychoanalytic standpoint the Foucaldian deconstruction of the true discourse betrays assumptions that can only be characterized as a classically male flight from maternal foundations. If feminism necessarily embraces these foundations, then a Foucaldian feminism is a contradiction in terms (**After Foucault**, 138).

Despite his sabre-rattling, Balbus quickly reveals his intention of reconciling Foucault to feminism. With his obvious desire to cut Foucault down to size, however, this will to reconcile the first to the second appears more like a will to have the first thoroughly reformed. As such, it may be viewed as the offensive counterpart to Michael Kelly's defensive strategy. In the case of the latter, the will to reconcile Habermas to Foucault appears more like a will to have the second take charge of the first. (See pages 17-19.)

> I shall argue that this opposition between feminism and Foucault can be resolved in favour of feminism and – in

52 As this section goes on to illustrate, Balbus is something of a paper tiger while presuming that Foucault is such.

> part – against Foucault. This argument will entail a demonstration that there are aporias or internal inconsistencies in the Foucaldian position that can only be overcome through a reformulation of this position that would require us (a) to distinguish between libertarian and authoritarian true discourses and (b) to assign the feminist mothering discourse to the former rather than the latter category. Thus Foucault's discourse points – against itself – to the power of the very feminist discourse it would undermine (**AF**, 138-139).

In spite of the desire for a presumably amicable resolution, there is, within these passages, at least a trace of a martial tone which, as it seems, means to disconcert. It announces in a concise and forceful way that there is a powerful discourse on one side and an internally weak one on the other. But the former, renouncing the role of juggernaut, will submit itself to bringing the latter around to a more favourable disposition. Moreover, part of the strategy is to assume that feminist psychoanalytic theory is the worthy representative of feminist discourse in general and, as also seems to be assumed, best suited for eradicating the growing tensions or potential for strife between it and Foucault.

It is not surprising that Jana Sawicki, in her critical defence of Foucault, offers a counter-critique which, along with immediately suggesting and then making the case for much common ground between Foucault and feminism, attacks the pretensions of feminist psychoanalytic theory. Her first sentence takes aim at the most aggressive point of Balbus's opening by asking: "Is Foucaldian feminism a contradiction in terms?" (**After Foucault**, 161). She then goes on to list what, in her estimation, are a number of areas of common concern and activity.[53] An authoritative pose which, despite itself, claims to be non-authoritarian and, moreover, to have the best interests at heart of both Foucault and feminism, thus encounters the resistance of – whatever uncertainty there may be with respect to some aspects of Foucault[54] – the feminist reception and use of him.

53 ". . . Foucault and feminists both focus on sexuality as a key arena of political struggle. Both expand the domain of the political to include forms of social domination associated with the personal sphere. And both launch critiques against forms of biological determinism, and humanism. Finally, both are sceptical of the human sciences insofar as they have participated in modern forms of domination. Indeed, rather than link the growth of knowledge with progress, both describe how the growth of specific forms of knowledge – for example, in medicine, psychiatry, sociology, psychology – has been linked to the emergence of subtle mechanisms of social control, and the elision of other forms of knowledge and experience" (*After Foucault*, 161).

54 This uncertainty or ambivalence is little more than hinted at in this particular essay (see note 55). It amounts to commenting on the fact that Foucault "never spoke of male

It must be admitted that, by not examining this reception and use and by centring his attack on purely logical problems, Balbus does not operate with the best of strategies. If logic were the only reason things were believed in, fought for, acted on, and brought to completion, we well know how much would be left idle. Logic is rather the backbone *within* any particular belief or activity. These beliefs or activities contend, backbones are broken, and embryonic ones form continually. In order be effective, Balbus's strategy would have to be less rigid but more industrious. It would have to show that the feminist use of Foucault is not just a contradiction in terms, but harmful, perhaps fatal, to feminism.

Given that the appropriation of certain types of discourse is usually quite a flexible, selective matter, the above is no easy task. In order to make his case that Foucauldian feminism is the equivalent of mixing oil and water (or nitrogen and glycerin), not only must Balbus be convincing on Foucault, he must also be convincing on feminism. Further complicating matters is that he is an open partisan of, and contributor to, one of but many theories competing for hegemony. Thus within the space of twenty pages, Balbus takes on three gigantic tasks: i) to refute Foucault, ii) to give a more or less definitive account of feminism, and iii) to assert with authority (but without being authoritarian) feminist psychoanalytic theory. In other words, he invites a counterattack on three fronts.

As far as putting forth arguments to allow an identification between feminism and feminist psychoanalytic theory, Balbus abstains entirely. Rather he assumes this identification when he declares that his task is one of resolving the opposition between Foucault and feminism by, in part, demonstrating that "mothering theory," as Sawicki refers to it, is a non-authoritarian discourse. In point of fact, his real objective is to defend this theory from Foucault by attacking the latter with the additional authority of the larger discourse and with the additional weight of Foucault's ostensibly being a threat to the whole of it. While such strategists may very well win favour with a limited number of partisan theorists and commentators, their presumption and lack of subtlety are a virtual recipe for alienating others. Moreover, rather than driving a wedge between Foucault and Foucauldian feminism, they are likely to make the latter, at least while they are on the defensive, less critical of him than they otherwise would be.[55]

In order to cover so much ground, Balbus relies on short summaries of

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domination per se" and that "he usually spoke of power as if it subjugated everyone equally" (*After Foucault*, 161).

55 In a later essay analysing the feminist response to Foucault both friendly and hostile, Sawicki herself periodically takes aim at him for such things as i) ignoring gender-specific technologies, ii) having only vague, undeveloped themes of political agency and resistance, and iii) being not sufficiently forceful in his political stances ("Foucault, Feminism, and Questions of Identity," in *The Cambridge Companion to Foucault*, 286- 313).

Foucault and feminist psychoanalytic theory. He divides these summaries under the headings of "History," "Totality," and "Subjectivity." According to these summaries, Foucault is an opponent of, because of their implicit authoritarianism, such items as i) continuous history, ii) totalizing discourses, and iii) subjectivity. Feminist psychoanalytic theory, on the other hand, supports all three. The next step, of course, is to problematize Foucault's opposition.

> The task begins with a demonstration that Foucaldians are implicitly committed to the very true discourses that they explicitly reject. Although Foucault's manifest discourse repudiates continuous history, totality, and founding subject, it is not difficult to detect in his writings a latent discourse in which each of these interrelated themes assumes a prominent place (150-151).

Requiring only three paragraphs, Balbus demonstrates that, first, Foucault's explicit commitment to power/knowledge complexes throughout history implicitly commits him to a continuous series of such complexes (151). Second, his explicit commitment to a disciplinary power running throughout all society implicitly commits him to "the very concept of totality which the genealogist would unambiguously condemn" (152). And, finally, the explicit commitment to a project of his own implicitly commits him to the notion of originating subject (153).

We might be excused if, behind these inconsistencies, we were to discern the outline of Habermas's three criticisms: presentism, relativism, and crypto-normativism. However, instead of elaborating these inconsistencies as fundamental problems (i.e., as a triple paradox of self-referentiality), Balbus treats them as simply the confusion resulting from three erroneous universals operating as Foucauldian premises. These three erroneous universals are i) that all *historically continuist* discourses are authoritarian, ii) that all *totalizing* discourses are authoritarian, and iii) that all *subjective* discourses are authoritarian.

> I assume . . . that the thesis of inevitably authoritarian effects of all true discourses [i.e., the discourses mentioned above] will have to be abandoned in favour of the authoritarian effects of some true discourses and the libertarian effects of others (153).

Balbus thereupon proceeds to show that *some* historically continuist discourses (i.e., developmental or evolutionary ones) are authoritarian and some are not (153); that *some* totalizing discourses (i.e., non-harmonious

and anti-humanistic ones) are authoritarian and some are not (154); and that *some* subjectivistic discourses (i.e., Cartesian ones) are authoritarian and some are not (155). By changing the above universal propositions to particular ones, and by specifying that feminist psychoanalytic theory, although historically continuist, totalizing, and subjectivistic, is i) non-developmental, ii) heterogeneously or humanistically harmonious, and iii) non-Cartesian, Balbus allows for a new syllogistic result: feminist psychoanalytic theory is non-authoritarian (156).

Thus the problematizing of Foucault becomes the deproblematization of the three categories of discourse which Foucault presumably opposes. This deproblematization, resulting from Balbus's universalistic portrayal of Foucauldian critique as being self-contradictory, then becomes, as a sort of second movement, the deproblematization of Foucault. More precisely, the latter's discourse is deproblematized when it is (or eventually will be) in keeping with the three categories of discourse that have been, thanks to Balbus's analysis, partially redeemed. All three categories are now deemed unproblematic, that is, when they are recognized as being not necessarily authoritarian. In short, it is possible for them to be i) historically continuist but non-developmental, ii) totalizing but harmonious, and iii) subjectivistic but non-Cartesian. Insofar as de-universalized Foucauldian critique can accommodate itself to these discourses, and insofar as these same discourses cannot be covert accomplices of male domination, it then follows that Foucauldian critique may join feminist psychoanalytic theory and, hence, feminism as a non-authoritarian true discourse.[56]

Sawicki's defensive strategy, the basis of which we have already laid down in relation to Balbus's strategic weakness, is three-pronged: i) the counter-reconstruction of Foucault as the re-particularizing of his discourse in terms of its theoretical independence, ii) the counter-problematizing of feminist psychoanalytic theory or, as Sawicki refers to it, mothering theory, and iii) the deproblematizing of the feminist use of Foucault which, broadly speaking, is the counter-problematizing of Balbus's reconstruction of feminism.

Sawicki's counter-reconstruction of Foucault resembles Kelly's in that she takes up Foucault's account of power as a multitude of complex, subtle,

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56 This conclusion is not the one Balbus expressly gives at the end of his essay. Here he is content to claim no more for his arguments than that they demonstrate that "feminist psychoanalytic theory . . . satisfies all three criteria [of non-authoritarianism] and thus that the Foucaldian should take it seriously" (*After Foucault*, 156). However, in his discussion of feminism under the headings of "History," "Totality," and "Subjectivity," there is a theoretical presentation of matters to the effect that, outside feminism, all discourse is under the sway of male domination. ("Feminist psychoanalytic theory – along with other feminists – understands the history of all hitherto existing societies as a history of subordination by and to men.") (140).

insidious, and highly ambiguous relations constituting society and the subject in society (**AF**, 164). So all-pervasive, in fact, are these power relations that they inevitably have a determinant and operative role in the most sophisticated and seemingly objective theories.

> Foucault adopted a skeptical stance toward the emancipating claims of liberal and Marxist theories insofar as they were based on essentially total theories of humanity, its history, economy, and libidinal economy. His genealogy is not a theory of power or history in any traditional sense, but an antitheory (164).

Here we have the particularistic counter-insistence which can only fall back on the refrain: "I am myself (i.e., Antitheory). Do not mistake me for another." No more can it prove this claim and sanctify this injunction than the other insistence can prove and sanctify that, insofar as universal principles implicitly present themselves in the analytic of power qua antitheory, it too is theory and should be treated as such. Behind these two irreconcilables are simply two different perspectives, their relative strength dependent on personal proximity, inclination, interest, capacity, upbringing, and ultimately the infinitely fine-grained extension of these things into extra-personal concerns and consensus.

But when we are involved in a struggle (and polemics is a struggle), we forego subtleties which weaken our position. Insofar as this struggle maintains itself at a certain level, this drive towards simplification, being usually the mere repetition or slight variation of both well-worn and well-received ideas, constitutes, we might say, the intellectual chess game of the unabashedly polemical. With respect to the two camps of the Foucauldian debate, the drive to simplification is most noticeable in the critically attacking one. Here the rule almost seems to be to accord to Foucault's thought a suspiciously overloaded look or "Wizard of Oz" effect. By contrast, the critical defenders deny this aspect entirely. But Foucault himself knew his position (or positions) to be not this "either/or" of faithful friend or remorseless foe.[57]

Jana Sawicki's critical defence, being a hard-line one, certainly does not have as its priority outlining the prickly aspects (such as Foucault's

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57 No one can doubt that Foucault takes pains when he renders the complex thought of his books into the more accessible form of interviews, lectures, and seminars. Insofar as this discursive movement, not only sociable and helpful, is a "de-paradoxicalizing" of the earlier presentation, it is philosophical as well as virtuous. But, on the other hand, insofar as all simplification about life is falsification, the truer, really more philosophically oriented encounter is with the dense, abstruse texts which often resist and confound. And yet, in one interview, Foucault refers almost disparagingly to these texts as fictions.

silence on certain issue)[58] of a feminist embrace of Foucault. She touches lightly on the matter in the second paragraph of her essay and dismisses it in Foucault's favour by the end of the third.

> Perhaps as an advocate of what he called the "specific intellectual" he would have thought it best to leave specifically feminist research to those engaged in feminist struggle (162).

In fact, so ardent a defender is she in the face of Balbus's critique that the issue of Foucault's providing a ringing endorsement of feminism (or something less) should not even arise.

> . . . [G]enealogy does not tell us what is to be done or offer us a vision of a better society. Instead, genealogy offers advice on how to look at established theories and a method for analysing them in terms of their power effects (164).

Now it should be noted that the terms *feminist* and *theory* never come together in Sawicki's essay. Such a move, no doubt, would turn the critical knife inwards and invite genealogical self-analysis. Strategically then, the important thing is to keep distance between the two. Sawicki thus deflects attention towards those older theories such as psychoanalysis, Marxism, and liberal humanism which, already having flown and fluttered about for so long, have become something of historical specimens.

> . . . [D]etermining the liberating status of any theoretical discourse is a matter of historical inquiry, not theoretical pronouncements. From a Foucaldian perspective, no discourse is inherently liberating or oppressive (166).

Being, historically speaking, a theoretical infant, feminism is primarily its present-day practise. Its link with genealogy is one of wielding the latter vivisectionally against the dominant complexes.[59]

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58 See notes 54 and 55.

59 "Inspired by Foucault's description of the ways in which modern individuals are produced, Sandra Bartky provides her own compelling descriptions of the disciplinary technologies that produce specifically feminine forms of embodiment, for example, dietary and fitness regimes, expert advice on how to walk, talk, dress, style one's hair, and wear one's make-up. Bartky uses Foucault's model of power to show how these technologies subjugate by developing competencies, not simply taking power away. She explains that one reason such technologies are so effective is that they involve the acquisition of skills and are associated

In making her case that genealogy is antitheory, Sawicki systematically dismantles Balbus's tottering syllogistic edifice. First of all, she undercuts the three universal principles Balbus constructs and ascribes to Foucault (i.e., that all historically continuist, all totalizing, and all subjectivistic discourses are authoritarian). The immediate step is to attack the main predicate term by denying the unproblematic distinction between authoritarian and liberatory discourses.

> [Foucault] described the historical conditions that made it possible for certain representations, objectifications, and classifications of reality to dictate which kinds of statements came up as candidates for truth or falsity, which sort of questions and answers were taken seriously. These conditions are not only constraining but also enabling. Presumably they contain possibilities for liberation as well as domination (166-167).

Next she attacks two of the three key assumptions which underlie the universalizing constructs. Instead of Foucault's being opposed to continuous history, she presents him as one who "was not rejecting the concept of continuity altogether" (168).

> Balbus incorrectly assumes that the purpose of genealogy is to *demonstrate* discontinuity. To the contrary, the isolation of discontinuity is the starting point of genealogy, not its aim (168).

Instead of Foucault's being opposed to subjectivity, she responds with the following:

> He believed the humanist discourses that place the subject at the center of reality or history had failed to grasp the extent to which the subject is fragmented and decentered in the social field. But to describe the way in which individuals have been dominated through a rigid attachment to particular modern identities is not equivalent to rejecting identity *tout court* (174).

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with a central component of female identity, namely, sexuality. The disciplines enhance the power of the subject while simultaneously subjugating her. Hence, women become attached to them and regard feminist critiques of the feminist aesthetic as a threat" (*After Foucault*, 174-175).

When Balbus, in order to construct his valid argument, replaces the universalizing constructs with particular premises, Sawicki attacks the assumption that Foucault himself has a totalizing discourse and, as a consequence, justifies disqualifying his opposition to such discourses.

> . . . Foucault's comments about the book [i.e., *Discipline and Punish*] indicate that it was intended not as a portrait of the whole of society, but, rather, as a genealogy of the emergence of the ideal of a perfectly administered social system (169).

In this manner, she leaves intact only one of the three critiques – the repudiation of totalizing theories – which Balbus attributes to Foucault. It now becomes the basis of her own counter-critique.

As we already noted, along with providing a short summary of Foucault, Balbus provides a tandem account of, under the same headings of "History," "Totality," and "Subjectivity," feminist psychoanalytic theory. The principal claims of the latter are: i) that there is universal male domination (140), ii) that this domination is the direct result of women's traditional role as primary nurturers of infants and young children (141), and iii) that male domination, once men fully accede to the same nurturing role, will disappear (142). Showing no reticence when it comes to specifying large-scale objectives, Balbus goes on:

> So it is that coparenting is essential not only for the overcoming of male domination but also for the supersession of political and technological domination. It is in this sense that the struggle against patriarchy must be understood as a struggle for an entirely new civilization without domination (144).

Apparently Balbus never took the time to consider that struggle in and of itself may very well carry the seeds of future forms of domination. Certainly history indicates something along these lines. However, Sawicki forgoes this pessimistic or empirical challenge[60] in favour of weighing, vis-a-vis the empirical fact of widespread male domination, the explanatory power of mothering theory against that of genealogy.

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60 This challenge only arises with her insofar as she cites Marxism and liberal humanism as examples of attempts "to formulate a global or systematic discourse of the historical or social totality in order to legitimate programs and practices as progressive or emancipatory" (*After Foucault*, 163).

> When Balbus argues that a Foucaldian could and should accept mothering theory . . he misses the point of Foucault's genealogy. It is not the empirical claim that male domination has appeared . . . which a Foucaldian would resist, but the attempt to deduce it from a general theory and to privilege a single locus of resistance. For a Foucaldian, patriarchy is the name of a global effect of domination made possible by a myriad of power relations at the micro level of society. By eschewing reductionism, the Foucaldian can bring to light the heterogeneous forms that gender embodiment, the practice of mothering, and power relations producing gendered individuals take. Without rejecting mothering theory, the genealogist adopts a critical attitude towards it, specifically towards the totalistic reductionism that obscures historical contents (171).

Mothering theory, in other words, must be "stripped of its global dimensions," "not be accorded the theoretical privilege that Balbus demands," and discredited insofar as it "claim[s] to be universal and to represent the Archimedean leverage point from which society must be moved" (174-175).

Although Sawicki does not deal specifically with the matter of Balbus's conception of feminism, her attack on mothering theory is, if we may ignore the very few signs of tolerance for it, the attempt to sink it as the presumed flagship of feminism. After all, what does it really mean not to reject a theory (as Sawicki claims when outlining her position above) when the interlocutor, expounding on it, has nary a good word to say about it? Certainly it must mean that, at the very least, she banishes it from main consideration and highest regard. Since Balbus holds mothering theory to be the answer to all the world's ills, to say that no rejection is involved is mere etiquette. Furthermore (and perhaps this is the unkindest cut of all), she points to his theory's *own* potential for doing ill.

> . . . [S]ome feminists have already observed [that] mothering theory may unwittingly reinforce heterosexist norms. . . . It is clear that Balbus has only two genders in mind (172).

> Postmodern feminists Nancy Fraser and Linda Nicholson have criticized mothering theory for adopting the Freudian premise "that there is a basic sense of self constituted at an early age through the child's interactions with its

> parents," and for assuming that this gendered deep self continues through all adult life and cuts across divisions of race, class, ethnicity, and so forth (113).

In other words, we catch a glimpse here of embryonic realms of intolerance, devaluation, and exploitation. She cites, for example, "the case of the hermaphrodite, Herculine Barbin, whose memoirs Foucault unearthed and edited" (167). Also she makes reference to another culture wherein child-bearing practises, although they exhibit their own inner logic, contradict a main feature of mothering theory (171). Is the latter in the moral position, as Sawicki seems to imply, to overrule this culture and remake it in its own image? With these criticisms and questions, she no doubt gives implicit voice to a feminism of far greater range and diversity than what Balbus seems to offer.

If we now regard the critical strategies from a distance, we perceive one which, despite its ostensible objective of resolving matters between Foucault and feminism, really wishes to change the former beyond recognition.[61] We then perceive another which, despite a certain tolerance for the opponent's position, gives little if any indication of having genuine respect for it. It is as much as to say that the nature of polemics, lying somewhere between discussion and diatribe, is a fundamental division which two or more contending parties, either wholly or in part, deny. No doubt this denial allows the exchange to take place and, at least in the first instance, brings the opponents to greater awareness of each other. Slippages and partial transformations likely follow although, within the framework of the debate itself, they are less important than the fundamental division. Moreover, it no doubt operates practically to direct various parties to or confirm various parties on either one side or the other. It functions, in other words, as an expedient or shortcut for those parties that, although they have an interest in taking sides on a particular issue, cannot, for one reason or another, fully devote themselves to it.

Rhetorically speaking, Balbus's assault is on male domination and, since the latter includes virtually everything outside feminism (and, specifically, feminist psychoanalytic theory), it really demands the subtlety, panache, audacity, industry, and immense buffoonery of a feminist version of Nietzsche. How would the latter have fared, we may ask, if his sweeping attack on Western values were no more than a series of pedantic generalizations? The strategic weakness of Balbus's account and critique, in

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61 Sawicki charges Balbus with something to the same effect. "In what follows I shall argue that Balbus's effort to reconcile Foucaldian and feminist discourse deradicalizes Foucault's analysis of power and begs some of the most important questions that he raises" (*After Foucault*, 165).

other words, leaves him with no choice but to treat his partisan claims, given under the headings of "Feminism on History," "Feminism on Totality," and "Feminism on Subjectivity," as being more or less self-evident. In addition, he must resort to two artifices – treating feminism as monolithic and treating himself as the legitimate spokesperson for all feminists (except perhaps Foucauldian ones) – in order to assert himself so titanically. Actually, there are two more artifices, one of which is to imply that his courage and integrity, in relation to Foucault's, are true coinage.

> The much more modest but far less dangerous task of the intellectual – the specific rather than the universal intellectual – is simply to struggle against the power that operates in his or her own local disciplinary domain (143).

Elsewhere he lets slip the fact that his effort is "principled and not merely strategic" (150). The other and what we should call the fourth artifice is his juxtaposing his accounts of Foucault and feminist psychoanalytic theory in such a way that (before he formally presents his critique) the second always functions as the refutation of the first. For example, his account of "Foucault on History" ends with the assertion: "History, in short, has no meaning" (140). Four paragraphs later, in his account of "Feminism on History," we receive the line: "History has a meaning, and that meaning is the flight from and repudiation of the mother" (142).

As we might expect, what stands primarily as a syllogistic house of cards does not really require the rhetorical inflation of the opposing position (à la Janicaud) or the rhetorical deflation of the position being opposed (à la Connelly). Since Balbus's position is so poorly constructed, it need only be dismantled and since it is so highly inflated, it need only be punctured. As already mentioned, Sawicki refers to it some twenty times (over sixteen pages) as *mothering theory* – a term hardly meant to bestow on feminist psychoanalytic theory the status to which, in Balbus's hands, it openly aspires. In fact, it could very well be looked upon as a pejorative to the extent that it suggests over-protectiveness and excessive indulgence. *Straw figure*, another term which connotes weakness, finds employment in Sawicki's attack on Balbus's proposition, attributed to Foucault's position, that "all true discourses are inevitably authoritarian . . ." (166). A couple of times she refers to the theory as *quasi-biological*, (163, 172), once as *quasi-essentialis*t, (173), and, on another occasion, she links it to the word *traditional* (as in the expression "traditional emancipatory theories") (170). Her most aggressive trope is to call it "theoretical humanism with a vengeance" (172). All in all, however, there is little in her essay which matches the rhetorical excesses of the other polemicists.

– Conclusion –

Let us sum up this study of the debate between the allies and adversaries of Michel Foucault. First of all, it is limited in that it only involves three critical attackers (Habermas, Taylor, and Balbus) and four critical defenders (Kelly, Janicaud, Connelly, and Sawicki). While attempting to be fairly diverse, it nonetheless best represents the more polarized end of the Foucauldian debate. Secondly, while striving for a certain amount of objectivity, balance, and control, it also operates personally and cathartically. To put it another way, it employs the third person plural only to the extent of anticipating that there are others who share this thinker's ambivalence towards and sometimes sharp aversion to polemics and, at least for the space of this study, have a willingness to counter the usual suppression of these feelings.

Thirdly, this study operates along two investigative axes: 1) underlying principles which animate the polemical engagement and 2) strategies and tactics which shape it. The underlying principles are universalistic insistence and particularistic counter-insistence. With Habermas the former is mainly the insistence on Foucault's thought being a continuous attack on subject-centred or instrumental reason which, along with the insistence on the totalizing nature of Foucault's theory of power, becomes the insistence on Foucault's attacking the length and breadth of modernity. With Taylor it is mainly the insistence on a universal good which the rise of modern society manifests, however imperfectly, and which ineluctably but contradictorily reveals itself at the heart of Foucault's own analyses. With Balbus it is mainly the insistence on universal male domination as a historico-cultural fact prior to and only exclusive of those kinds of discourse (e.g., feminist psychoanalytic theory) which seek to undermine it.

The three levels of strategic and tactical activity are evaluative, logical, and rhetorical. The first corresponds to the contextualization of the opponent's thought, the second to the problematization of it, and the third to the prejudicial presentation of it. The reconstruction of the opponent's thought spans the gap between its contextualization and its problematization. The counter-contextualization and counter-reconstruction also involve the deproblematization of the thought being defended. Thus Kelly defends Foucault against Habermas's charge of paradoxical self-referentiality by arguing that self-referentiality is the problem of modern critique in general. Janicaud defends Foucault against Habermas's implicit charge of Nietzschean irrationalism by arguing that power operates within various and even highly sophisticated forms of rationality. Connelly defends Foucault against Taylor's charge of incoherency by arguing that being always outstrips knowledge and, as a consequence, one form of incoherency is really battling it out with another. Sawicki defends Foucault against Balbus's

charge of the former's being implicitly in support of holistic enterprises of a certain kind by arguing that genealogy is not political theory but rather its constant watchdog or critic.

The fourth major point about this study is that, in order to economize, it assumes or presumes to have a dramatic form. There is a progressive disclosure of methodology, matter, character, and conflict. The arguments of Section I, springing from Habermas's critical attack on Foucault, emphasize the realm of the meaningful and the truthful. The arguments of Section II, springing from Taylor's critical attack on Foucault, emphasize the realm of the moral. The arguments of Section III, springing from Balbus's critical attack on Foucault, emphasize the realm of the political. In addition (and this is the fifth point), this study demonstrates that, in concert with the theme of scholarly polemics being a sophisticated and sublimated form of verbal warfare, the ideal of objectivity functions not only as the standard for removing the crudest aspects of partiality and prejudice, but also as the mask for their more refined but fundamental operation.

Of course there are a good many other attacks on and defences of Foucault. No doubt the vast majority could be, if required, analytically inserted into this study and given a place on the polemical field. Except in a few rare cases, boundaries would not have to be significantly adjusted.[62] Many if not most of the critical attackers of Foucault – scholars such as

62 Tom Keenan's essay, being in general agreement with the conclusions of Habermas, Taylor, and Fraser but opposed to the reasoning which brings these thinkers to them (8), polemically straddles the divide between the two camps while being largely sympathetic to and supportive of Foucault. As such, it presumes itself, like this study, to be closer to presenting the field than to being on it. (See note 80.)

Nancy Fraser,[63] Dieter Freundlieb,[64] Axel Honneth,[65] David Levin,[66] Thomas McCarthy,[67] Stephen White,[68] and Pyong-Yoong Yoon[69] – either follow Habermas fairly closely in their arguments or else employ ones which he himself cites and uses (e.g., those of Axel Honneth and Nancy Fraser).[70] Other scholars such as Richard Bernstein[71] and David Ingram,[72] occupying a kind of polemical middle-ground (i.e., they are sympathetic to and critical of both sides), spend most of their time identifying the extremities and perhaps trying to pull them closer together. Then some scholars, notably Richard

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63 A very common tactic of scholarly polemics is to begin with a short outline testifying to the willingness of the critic to be up front, straightforward, and virtually transparent in the presentation of matters. However, what is outwardly commendatory can also operate as camouflage insofar as these same matters may swiftly and unobtrusively introduce themselves as far simpler and more settled than they actually are. Thus Nancy Fraser begins her essay (see note 13) by characterizing genealogy as a politically engaged discourse on modernity (272). In so doing, she immediately relegates the diagnostically historical to a subordinate position. What now counts – what forms her contextualization of Foucault, in other words – is the prescriptive or political basis on which genealogy seeks to operate. The demand to reveal and substantiate universal principles (i.e., normative standards) follows directly from the assumption that Foucault means to frame a single, utterly coherent response to modernity.

64 There are some scholars who, qua polemicists, avail themselves of another's strategy to the point of spending the greater part of their time reproducing it. That is to say, they go over all the main points and arguments, adding some emphasis here and there while reserving their own contribution for the end. Such is the case with Dieter Freundlieb in his essay, "Rationalism v. Irrationalism?: Habermas's Response to Foucault" (*Inquiry*, 31, June, 1988, 171-191). To drive the Habermasian nail home – to sink the very head of it into the wood – means accusing Habermas of overlooking yet another form of relativism in Foucault's thought (184-185). In effect, he wants to enlarge on Habermas's charge of a thrice paradoxical self-referentiality and make it a quadruple one.

65 To highlight the universalistic counter-tendency in *Discipline and Punish*, to render it primary, conceptually independent, and theoretically "complete"; to present it as surreptitiously serving the genealogical account of the French penal system and related institutions – this strategy is the operative principle in Axel Honneth's article, "Foucault's Theory of Society: A Systems-Theoretic Dissolution of *The Dialectics of the Enlightenment*" (*Critique and Power*, 157-183). Contextualizing Foucault by situating him in a larger discourse or tradition (as Habermas does) is foregone in favour of making the *reconstruction* of him the evaluative basis for problematizing him. As a theory of society then, Foucault's thought can be criticized for surreptitiously shifting from institutional conflict to institutional coordination (176-177).

66 Some critical attacks operate quite openly as part of a larger strategy to put forward or profit a position at some remove from the debate at hand. David Michael Levin, in his essay, "The Body Politic: The Embodiment of Praxis in Foucault and Habermas," (*Praxis International*, 9,1/2, April and July, 1989, 112-132), targets Foucault as a reductionist while lauding Habermas as a grand social theorist. Denouncing the "Foucauldian" body as a mere product of social forces, he then moves on to praising the "Merleau-Ponty" body of inherent sociability and attunement to universal justice (118).

67 Thomas McCarthy, in his essay, "The Critique of Impure Reason: Foucault and the Frankfurt School" (*Critique and Power*, 243-282), does the usual thing of treating Foucault

Rorty, are harsh critics of some non-theoretical but general trait of Foucault. In Rorty's case, it appears to be Foucault's giving the intellectual cold shoulder to bourgeois liberalism.[73] Then there are, of course, the numerous commentators with specific complaints or technical objections. However, the latter, given the fact that Foucault was a painstaking researcher, never seriously challenge the theoretical side of his thought.

As for the other critical defenders,[74] [75] [76] [77] [78] [79] they would simply supply, if deposited on the field of this study, a greater variety of counter-

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as one who constructs a theory which traverses his historical investigations as opposed to one who conducts different investigations with different theoretical approaches. As a result, instead of granting to Foucault an overlapping project offering different perspectives on the social field, McCarthy credits him with – as well as debiting him for the failure of – an attempt to give a standard account of it.

68 The universalistic reconstruction of Foucault by his opponents repeatedly erases the distinction between the *methodological* suspension of subjectivity and moral principles and the readmission of these desiderata in the social or political role genealogy may assume. In other words, the insistence is that, if his diagnoses of the past are to be taken seriously, they should lead to viable prescriptions for the present and future. See Stephen White's essay, "Foucault's Challenge to Critical Theory" (*American Political Science Review*, Vol. 80, No. 2, June, 1986, 419-432).

69 The conflation of genealogy qua means of historical investigation and genealogy qua social theory which must be answerable to its own postulates is very much in evidence in Pyong-Yoong Yoon's essay, "Habermas and Foucault: On Ideology – Critique and Power/Knowledge Nexus" (*Kinesis*, 17, Spring, 1987, 87-103).

70 *The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity*, 284 and 287.

71 Even with some of the most sensitive and sympathetic critics of Foucault (e.g., Richard Bernstein with his "Foucault's Critique as Philosophical Ethos," (*Critique and Power*, 211-241), we cannot help but notice that the emphasis falls on seeking to clarify Foucault's ethical stance as teaching or doctrine. The idea that Foucault might have *lived* ethically hardly seems to warrant consideration.

72 David Ingram, in his essay, "Foucault and Habermas on the Subject of Reason" (*The Cambridge Companion to Foucault*, 215-261), moves from being a critical attacker to a critical defender of Foucault in accordance with a reconstruction which essentially makes the latter's last two works a refutation of the earlier ones. Very much with Habermas in his condemnation of a theory of power which dissolves the subject into a myriad of power relations, he nonetheless sides with Foucault and against Habermas when, according to him, Foucault shifts to a theory of the subject with power relations as the basis of social interaction (237).

73 Richard Rorty, in his essay, "Moral Identity and Private Autonomy," (*Michel Foucault: Philosopher*, 328-335), accuses Foucault of having anarchist tendencies and bearing an unwarranted hostility towards liberal society. Given such a short address (six pages), he can hardly mount a critique of Foucault's work so much as criticize him for foisting himself on the public as a political role model (329, 331). In this, Rorty seems to perform two universalistic reconstructions. First, by casting Foucault as a would-be role model for everyone and, second, by casting liberal society as a "best of all possible worlds."

74 Nancy Fraser, among other critics, takes Foucault to task for utilizing liberal humanist values in an implicit critique of modernity while otherwise giving what looks to be like a neutral or anarchistic account of it. Alexander Hooke, in his essay, "The Order of Things: Is

contextualizations, counter-reconstructions, and counter-problematizations. To speak more conventionally, they too would find certain key assumptions to be questionable and, in effect, dispensable. Then new ones would quickly take their place and, with them, new lines of logic, that is, new lines of attack or defence. Sometimes, however, one line noticeably conflicts with that of an ostensible ally. In his defence of Foucault, for example, Michael Kelly treats the paradoxical self-referentiality of modern critique as an epistemological problem (i.e., one that presumably requires ongoing

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Foucault's Antihumanism against Human Action?" (*Political Theory*, Vol. 15, No. 1, February, 1987, 38-60), responds by drawing a distinction between basic human values which antedate modernity and these same values comprehensively ordered according to the paradigm of contractual law. In this way, he provides a contrary evaluative basis which crosses out the straightforward contradictoriness or necessary confusion in Foucault's having to employ values to register a critical intent.

75 Defensive strategies, like offensive ones, vary in their degree of intensity and openness. For example, Joanna Hodge, in her essay, "Habermas and Foucault: Contesting Rationality" (*Irish Philosophical Journal*, 7, 1990, 60-78), makes what is an unusually restrained comparison between Foucault and Habermas. But this does not prevent her from proclaiming the issues themselves to be important (75) and showing more approval of the unsettling methods of the former than the good intentions of the latter.

76 Foucault's presumably last-minute embrace of Kant and the Enlightenment, often criticized for being at odds with the major part of his work, is the issue with which James Schmidt and Thomas E. Wartenberg deal in their essay, "Foucault's Enlightenment: Critique, Revolution, and the Fashioning of the Self" (*Critique and Power*, 283-314). Here they reconstruct Foucault's embrace of Kant to show that it was, first, far from being a last-minute affair and, second, intimately related to his view of modernity. The two nodal points are a heightened philosophical interest in the historical present and acceptance of certain limitations on knowledge.

77 The implacable sense that we are philosophically undone if our values are not in place logically or argumentatively meets with the response that such narrowness of vision is passé – that values themselves are more varied, flexible, and fleeting than the thought that tries to frame them. The insistence, in other words, is that we possess only the *illusion* of their permanence and stability. But this illusion itself is a valuing that is unquestionably widespread, tenacious, and vital. So far as we are able to make out then, it only has the philosophical mood against it. But the latter is part of a high-end contentiousness hardly legible at the day-to-day level of struggle. It is part of a very local if rather busy and elevated one where, straining to free itself from something called error, thought only ends up re-entangling itself. So far as being able to straighten itself out and project itself definitively on the larger stage, it fails. But so far as it does so with a definite look about it, it succeeds.

Such thoughts, at any rate, come to me while looking over Paul Rabinow's and Hubert L. Dreyfus's essay, "What is Maturity? Habermas and Foucault on 'What is Enlightenment?'" (*Foucault: A Critical Reader*, 109-121).

78 In his response to Charles Taylor's attack on Foucault, Paul Patton, in his essay, "Taylor and Foucault on Power and Freedom" (*Political Studies*, XXXVII, 1989, 260-276), falls into the trap of trying to counter the charge of incoherence by introducing new terms, distinctions, and concepts into Foucault's quasi-theory of power. In effect, he joins the opponent's game of treating it as a full-blown account of society rather than the basis of

philosophical work). Thomas Keenan, on the other hand, argues that paradox is the very relation itself between power and knowledge.[80] The more traditional philosophical orientation (i.e., Michael Kelly's), roughly pursuing the same strategic objective as the less traditional one (i.e, Thomas Keenan's), thus confronts what is essentially hostile to it.

Now this study operates on the basis that scholarly debate resembles a highly competitive game like chess. The latter allows for an infinite number of moves and yet the pieces, the board, the rules – unlike assumptions, propositions, and subjects of debate – maintain a stable presence. In spite of this, we often play the polemical game as if it were a matter of finding spaces to occupy permanently. It is as if we, playing it earnestly and expending so much energy in making our moves, end up suffering from a kind of critical exhaustion. Not the exhaustion of wanting to renounce the game openly, but the exhaustion of coming to the belief that, so far as *we* are concerned, it no longer is a game that is ongoing, perhaps changing itself at the very moment it seems most stable.

Thus to deny it as a game becomes, we might say, the first rule. However much it may resemble a game, however much outsiders may scorn it as such, there must be this unquestioned faith in it as a quest for final results. So often then does it strike us as this pose that we – part of ourselves, at any rate – clamber about for a no doubt lonelier, more perilous position. Already we have been taught that there is the risk of ending up

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limited, highly specific investigations of it. Interestingly enough, it is usually the precision and detail of the latter which Foucault's harshest critics single out for commendation. A more insightful defence then would be to target the implication that Foucault would have done better without his "theory."

79 René Robert Fillion, in his essay, "Foucault *contra* Taylor: Whose sources? Which self?" (*Dialogue*, vol. XXXIV, No. 4, Fall, 1995), provides exactly the more insightful kind of strategy mentioned in note 78. Instead of expending his whole effort on the issue of incoherency (whether it be Foucault's or Taylor's), he puts forward their different ways of writing and viewing history in relation to the moral concerns of the present. The key idea is that excessive piety or reverence for certain moral dispositions and conceptual frameworks precludes having the highest critical sensitivity to those practises – often the cherished offspring of these same dispositions and frameworks – which belie them.

80 It is the life of the paradox, the paradoxical life of philosophy and politics which Tom Keenan brings to life in his highly distinctive essay, "The Paradox of 'Knowledge' and 'Power': Reading Foucault on a Bias" (*Political Theory*, Vol. 15, No. 1, February, 1987, 5-37). Instead of the usual exercise of trying either to tie or untie a knot in the discourse about the convoluted relations between knowledge and power, he builds the case that the very tying and untying, ceaselessly reenacting and rearticulating themselves, are the matter and range of all theoretical and practical activity. But where *we* are currently situated and *we* are most interested is where right as controlling state or society and right as liberating act or event contend with and assert themselves against each other. To move around and within this aporia; to find our centre precisely by no longer thinking in terms of one centre over another, is the difficult task – but still a task – which demands our highest ethical concern and involvement.

speaking only to ourselves, a kind of solipsistic attunement so different from what is traditionally valued and sought. And yet if we at least admit it as part of our nature, we catch a glimpse of the split, the division, the reason why there is no perfect rest but perhaps, now and then, a few “perfect” moves.

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– Appendix I: Some Questions and Answers –

1. How would you sum up what this study accomplishes?

In broadest terms, it sheds a light on the nature of scholarly debate. In narrowest terms, it gives an idea of how exceptional thought can be mishandled in polemical engagement.

2. Would you please elaborate on this last point?

Such mishandling results from its combative and competitive dimension. As the will to win, it can never be completely the will to truth. At the same time this dimension, however obvious it may be from the outside, goes largely unrecognized from within.

3. It is clear that you identify Foucault with exceptional thought and his opponents with something less. Since the debate that you study, however, is not between Foucault and his critics but rather between his allies and his adversaries, what may be said about the former and their thought?

The defenders of Foucault's thought have as their target the thought of Foucault's critics. Whatever violence they do to it is mitigated by its being on the same level as theirs and by its standing in need of correction.

4. But you seem to be suggesting that all those engaging in scholarly debate have ulterior motives and illicit designs. Is this not something that you yourself are involved in?

Any thinker standing outside a strictly polemical engagement is more like one trying to give birth to a new idea than one trying to destroy the idea of another. On the other hand, any new idea, if it is to develop and prosper, is destined to become both the victim of unfair treatment and the scourge of whatever opposes it.

5. Are we correct in thinking that you take scholarly debate to be more deficient than generally acknowledged?

Certainly my study, an admittedly limited one, is the view that scholarly debate cannot be other than the site of unacknowledged interests that compromise its integrity. At the same time, this is not to deny its efficiency or even its integrity in a total accounting. It is merely to offer a counter-discourse that helps to preserve it or at least part of it as never-ending self-critique and self-examination. The Foucauldian debate, being a fairly lively

and controversial one, struck me as a worthy site for studying the strategies and tactics of this verbal combat. My main objection is that it so little acknowledges itself as such. No doubt this is an important part of strategy but perhaps it is outdated.

6. Although you don't come out and say it, it is clear that you favour the Foucauldian camp. How might a critic of Foucault, coming to your study, be persuaded by it if he finds this favouritism right from the start?

It was never my intention to hide the fact that my study owes much more to Foucault than to his adversaries. The very fact that I characterize it as a strategically limited study of various strategies and tactics in a particular debate should be enough to point out its main influence. What I am trying to do is to discount the notion that such discourses can come without prejudice and that it is preferable to keep quiet about this rather than to draw attention to it.

7. Perhaps we should focus a little more on your study. The case you're making is that what divides the two camps of the Foucauldian debate is essentially two principles.

Two principles that are opposed ways of viewing life, the world, the whole, etc. which discursively become two modes of decision-making, assertion, emphasis, repetition, appropriation, and closure or non-closure. These two pre-polemical dispositions form the ambiguous, impenetrable backdrop of my discussion. Empirical investigation here – psychological, sociological, biological – always leaves an unexplained remainder. Such accounts as traverse it, in other words, never bring the two sides wholly together.

8. So you're in the position of positing two forms of fundamental outlook and two corresponding ways of arguing without quite taking up residence yourself in one of them.

Insofar as one posits anything, one creates distance between the act of positing and the things posited. The division I am referring to pertains to what comes to the fore and asserts itself in polemical engagement.

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Appendix II: Further Reflections on Foucault and the Foucauldian Debate –

1. The advantages and limits of Foucault's conception of philosophical activity

I will limit myself to pointing out the particularity of Foucault's work, its singularity as discourse and practise (be these archeological or genealogical), its counter-movement with respect to the more traditional lines of historical analysis, its purposely disruptive or sceptical nature, and its challenge to the all too human tendency to exalt the thinking and practises of one's own particular time and place.

With regard to this last point, it operates as an ongoing corrective and counter-measure which challenges formalized practises and habitual modes of thinking. It shakes and disrupts them with critical exposures of everything intellectually and spiritually disconnected from the vigorous flow of ambiguous, multiple micro-events. The latter, normally captured by the artist, become, through Foucault's lens, the central ground of historical studies which, in a moral or ethical sense, seditiously relate past discourses and practises to present ones.

So far as the modern world, in a number of ways and to varying degrees, suffers from the dystopian effects of utopian schemes, the Foucauldian approach is vital to our understanding of the world. What Nietzsche called the youngest of the virtues, honesty, now comes to the fore – questioning, problematic, uncertain – helpful and hindering at the same time. Its main advantage is that it brings forth a new intellectual and spiritual strategy that, although it compounds difficulties, shuns a certain socio-historical smugness and sense of superiority. In seeking to address itself to a problem in the most rigorous way, the formal status of a social phenomenon – its status as large-scale homogeneous affair – is revealed to be underwritten by a complex configuration of events.

Idealism does not so much die here as, by constraining itself, become the preeminent struggle to close the gap between itself and what presumably is most truthful. Dealing justly with the past in relation to the present and recognizing the extra-human or anonymous forces at play in human affairs, including the highest ones, contributes to embracing philosophy as a way of life. This personal, non-objective side of the coin, less concerned with engaging in argument than engaging what is crucial and singular in one's experience, is a response to the over-valuing or one-sidedness of academia's grip on philosophy.

What Foucault most concretely or practically offers is a toolkit for those who wish to dismantle, rearrange, or widen the views which, all too common or easily offering their services, are generally reassuring and within whose precincts no one scruples to spot the most subtle, insidious dangers. With Foucault, the latter usually takes the form of certain enduring and deeply-rooted aspects of institutionalized practises which conflict with their formal purposes. The insane person who grows sicker and becomes more unmanageable even while undergoing treatment in the hospital, the prisoner who learns to become a better criminal or more embittered, anti-social person even while in corrective detention, the university student who quickly develops an aversion to emulating any of the great knowledge-seekers even while racking up high grades and pursuing academic excellence – such are the problematic areas systematically ignored or only receiving faint attention. By meticulously charting the contingent complexity of institutionalized discourses and practises, Foucault provides the means and motivation for exploring the possibility of thinking and doing otherwise. Like Nietzsche, he hands down an open-ended legacy and inimitable style that others may follow while, at the same time, finding their own way.

It is the case then that Foucault's mainly historical and historiographical work falls somewhere within the margins of philosophy. The latter, so far as it is the maintenance and smooth progression of existing orders of thought, likely negates or minimises its influence. And yet, so far as Foucault's work ceases to be fully its own movement and disperses itself within and around existing orders of thought, it places itself at the centre. From the point of view then that it remains intensely active and alive, it continues to be an anomaly, an uncertain region, a potentially destructive or creative force. From the point of view of its already losing itself in piecemeal fashion to decentring practises and purposes, it cannot help but fall under the sway of and be conquered by that to which it initially "opposes" itself, that is, fair argument among equals, rational consensus, and the appeal to universal principles.

2. The main lines of Habermas's critique of Foucault and their tenability

While locating Foucault within a Nietzschean strain of thought which purportedly exalts the irrational and sets itself against Enlightenment values, Habermas undertakes a survey of his work essentially in opposition to the estimation and characterization of it by Foucault and his supporters. Instead of looking upon it as a series of studies with different objects of study, he treats it as a single, unified project. Instead of its comprising a study of madness, a study of medicine, a study of the human sciences, a study of the prison, and a study of human sexuality, it becomes, for Habermas, a multi-

pronged attack on modernity. Specifically, Habermas construes it as the critique of subject-centred reason from the viewpoint of this critique's being abhorrently radical. Not content to devalue and decentre the subject qua conscious agent, Foucault, according to Habermas, does away with it completely. The result is that Foucault's peculiar historical studies contradict each other when they try to make anonymous rules that forge the constitutive elements of social being.

In books such as *The Order of Things* and *The Archeology of Knowledge*, Foucault deals with the internal, regulative features of discourse. Here it appears that thought and action are derived from the discursive rules which, subject always to alteration and replacement, both bracket and divide the true and the false, the good and the bad, the authoritative and non-authoritative, the sensible and the non-sensible. Habermas points out that, in order to account for what governs the alterations and replacement of discursive rules, Foucault, in books such as *Discipline and Punish* and *The History of Sexuality*, reverses direction, now taking the complex interaction of various practises or technologies to be the essential controlling or constituting principle. In Habermas's estimation, Foucault cannot have it both ways: he cannot found the active subject on the basis of the knowing subject while at the same time founding the knowing subject on the basis of the active one.

In addition to the double-bind or circularity which, in his accounts of various institutions, results from eliminating the subject as a term or point of reference, Foucault, according to Habermas, necessarily gets caught up in self-referential dilemmas. Identifying three, he charges Foucault with what he terms *presentism*, *relativism*, and *crypto-normativism*. The first is that, while Foucault, at first blush, offers scrupulously objective analyses of the past, the areas of study he chooses and the implicitly critical cast that he gives these analyses are rooted in present concerns which ineluctably colour and slant them. The second dilemma, relativism, is that, if truth, meaning, and value are located in truth-constituting, meaning-constituting, and value-constituting settings, then the truth, meaning, and value of Foucault's work, being so constituted, justifies not taking it too seriously. The third dilemma, crypto-normativism, is that, while Foucault removes from his historical analyses any trace of the normally operative ideals or principles (i.e., those referring to the rational subject, modern progress, democracy, freedom, human rights, etc.), the secret employment of them necessarily follows due to the implicitly critical or "exposé" character of them.

Now the main weakness of Habermas's first line of attack upon Foucault is the claim that the latter's work forms a single unified project. As much as

Habermas may marshal evidence to support this claim, Foucault's explicit denial of such a state of affairs, the very fact that his work repeatedly challenges the notion of such unities (i.e., by treating the elements of any unity as half-arbitrary events), and the wealth of counter-evidence which the supporters of Foucault can marshal, all go to make this claim problematic. With respect to the problem of self-referentiality, Habermas must, in direct opposition to Foucault, make the traditional distinction between theory and practise. This forces him not to recognize that it is only by strategically employing principles within a strictly limited domain that relevant elements come to light. From the point of view of Foucault's successfully carrying out such strategies, the Habermasian claim that Foucault hoists himself with his own petard is unwarranted. The problem of self-referentiality, in other words, dissolves when it is not a logical account of the whole that is strived for, but rather a theoretically open study trying to be as meticulous as possible in a particular area.

Summarizing, we may say that the core of Habermas's critique of Foucault is the rationalist's traditional attack upon the quasi-metaphysics of non-universalizing works, studies, or projects. The charges of circularity and self-destructive referentiality are the woof upon which Habermas weaves his political, social, and moral critique. This critique achieves its basic design by situating Foucault within a strain of thought harking back to Nietzsche which, according to Habermas, is dangerously hostile to the Enlightenment legacy. Starting with his claim that, in his analyses, Foucault relentlessly eliminates the role of the subject, Habermas argues that he then goes on to systematically distort the view of modern institutions, knowledge, and values by making them out to be less progressive and beneficial than they purport to be. But even more than this, Foucault impresses him as someone offering a critique of society that is politically conservative, reactionary, or even anarchistic. No doubt it is in the way of combatting this threat that his counter-critique – his calling into question the value, coherency, originality, and integrity of the Foucauldian corpus – ends up being almost as rhetorical as it is argumentative.

3. The general characteristics of a philosophical debate

In his book *What is is Philosophy?,* Gilles Deleuze sees the essence of philosophy as being the creation of concepts and, on a much wider front, the mastering of the chaos threatening us from within and without. If this view is to be accepted, it would follow that philosophical debate nourishes itself from these more or less singular events of creation and renders them social and institutional.

We may ask at this point: what is this realm of philosophical debate if not the receiving field that allots life and death to new-born ideas? Here the urgency is not so much to master the chaotic as to welcome, support, and pay homage to the latest contribution to knowledge or to attack and tear down the mere semblance of such. Since the same thing, however, can often be one or the other for different parties, it happens that two opposing sides will engage not only ideas but positions. And since both sides inevitably hoist and fly high the banner of argumentative procedure, the movement by which the chaotic is mastered coincides with various degrees and manifestations of conflict.

Hence the caricature of it in the popular mind which itself is dependent on philosophical doubt and self-doubt. Whatever there is of elevated thought in philosophy that this popular mind can take in, it owes to the lonely philosopher patiently giving birth to a new concept and to the small circle of scholars informing this act with value and meaning.

If the creation of concepts is the main movement of philosophy with this movement essentially made up of heterogeneous elements or events, philosophical debate itself must be a plethora of relatively limited moves that propel, promote, or proliferate each other not so much ahead of the dazzling new concept as around it. Indeed, we may say that any prolonged movement leaving behind these other ones is not so much a teleological progression as an unforeseen leap that results from the appearance of yet another new concept.

Of course the active role in debate and the view which informs it is, explicitly or otherwise, a counter-viewing, an immersion within some logical movement. If such were not the case, the extra-logical leap or attraction, freeing itself as much from its previous form as its previous content, would move towards the mythical, the mystical, or the irrational. Philosophy, in other words, owes it to debate that today we have something other than a host of Platonic, Hegelian, or Nietzschean epigones.

Summarizing, we may say that philosophical debate, though secondary to the appearance and development of new concepts, sustains and profiles the latter, disseminates them as an essential part of general development, provides a continuum or linkage between these concepts, and safeguards the form of philosophy from the threatening side of them.

Excursus: In my thesis I tailor the conception of philosophical debate to the analysis of certain exchanges between selected representatives of the more polarized end of the Foucaudian debate. I propose that these exchanges are

moves in a highly competitive game like chess and that they form three levels of strategic and tactical activity: the evaluative, the argumentative, and the rhetorical. In order to counter what is construed by one party as the troublesome or offending position of the other, some evaluative shift must take place which, being a universalistic versus particularistic stance or a particularistic versus universalistic stance, introduces new lines of argument offsetting and subverting the evaluative basis of the opponent. In theory such shifting and counter-shifting, along with the varying series of argumentative moves they produce, could go on indefinitely. In practise, however, specific debates with their corresponding positions and points of reference simply disappear when a new concept makes its appearance. But, to complicate matters even further, the rhetorical amplification of each and every evaluative basis within philosophical debate provides an endgame optics which allows the playing of the game to be viewed as being more than a game.

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Appendix III: Nietzsche, Foucault, Selfhood, and "On Being Personal"

In order to be or at least try to be rather adventurous and exploratory in the present undertaking, and in order to bring forward what I like to think will be my own best thought and not allow it to be either buried in the thought of others or buried by the major figures under consideration, I shall take the liberty as well as the risk of being less analytical, argumentative, and critically evaluative than literary or essayistic.

Now I realize that such an approach, if not wholly unwelcome, may easily be considered a treacherous straying from the straight and narrow path of scholarly precision. On the other hand, when faced with the daunting, elusive, and ambiguous task of investigating selfhood, it may not be entirely inappropriate to venture onto different ground, to tread a less safe and secure path than ordinarily trod, and, by so doing, perhaps to call into question the presumption and adequacy of the usual way. At least, to call these elements into question insofar as it proves possible to suspend this way and, by employing a more personal kind of rigour, find other ways of being precise.[1]

Now I see that I have already employed some equivocal language and I can only hope that, at this early juncture and in light of the above pronouncements, I am not suspected of secretly slipping into my discourse one or more arbitrary or obfuscating elements masked as some personal virtue. No, rather I must insist that this state of affairs is no more than indicative of the unavoidable equivocalness which, let us say, Nietzschean or Foucauldian honesty or cruelty[2] forces nowadays to the forefront of

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1 Perhaps this opening is somewhat misleading. After all, I do intend to document this text and offer additional explanation in the form of these footnotes. However, to employ a well-known term of Emerson's, self-reliance is the keynote of this undertaking and I feel the necessity, given the usual scholarly retreat from the all too personal, to sound it fully and in advance.

2 Cf. Nietzsche's *Beyond Good and Evil*, section 230. Here he states:

> This will to mere appearance, to simplification, to masks, to cloaks, in short, to the surface – for every surface is a cloak – is *countered* by that sublime inclination of the seeker after knowledge who insists on profundity, multiplicity, and thoroughness, with a *will* which is a kind of cruelty of the intellectual conscience and taste. Every courageous thinker will recognize this in himself, assuming only that, as fit, he has hardened and sharpened his eye for himself long enough and that he is used to severe discipline, as well as to severe words. He will say: 'there is something cruel in the inclination of my spirit'; let the

philosophy or at least to that part of it which can do nothing other than admit it, confront it, and even risk perishing from it. For philosophical thought, I should think, only has its life by overcoming or at least trying to overcome the equivocal, the uncertain, the paradoxical. To place these hostile elements at the very centre, to make them a kind of necessary condition of an either implicit or explicit total viewing of things – what can this be other than a sort of anti-philosophical event?[3]

It seems then that the modern-day dilemma of philosophy is its internal division, its perversely maintained, accentuated, and perhaps even growing disbelief in itself. It may also be its glorious failure which, like a fate not sought but not avoided either, is a measure of the faith in itself. At least, so it may be viewed if one takes seriously the possibility of philosophy's eventual demise, its perishing of its own truth.[4] In any event, what matters most here is that the present-day self or, let us say, the present-day theory

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virtuous and kindly try to talk him out of that!

3 Cf. Foucault's essay "Nietzsche, Genealogy, History," in *Language, Counter-Memory, Practice*, 162-164. Here he discusses Nietzsche's thought (while citing a number of pertinent passages from *The Dawn*, *The Gay Science,* and *Beyond Good and Evil)* obviously in relation to his own. Among other things, he remarks that the will to knowledge "dissolves the unity of the subject [and] releases those elements of itself that are devoted to its subversion and destruction." If it is the philosophical subject that is really at stake here, then perhaps what is being said is that there is at least *one* will to knowledge that, while haunting this subject, is hostile to it and that, by virtue of this innermost enmity, allows this subject to be itself in the fullest sense.

4 As well as section 45 of *The Dawn* given below*,* sections 429 and 501 of the same book and section 39 of *Beyond Good and Evil* bear on this not very popular outlook.

> *A tragic ending for knowledge*: Of all the means of producing exaltation, it has been human sacrifice which has at all times most exalted and elevated man. And perhaps every other endeavour could still be thrown down by *one* tremendous idea, so that it would achieve victory over the most victorious – the idea of *self-sacrificing mankind.* But to whom should mankind sacrifice itself? One could already take one's oath that, if ever the constellation of this idea appears above the horizon, the knowledge of truth would remain as the one tremendous goal commensurate with such a sacrifice, because for this goal no sacrifice is too great. In the meantime, the problem of the extent to which mankind can as a whole take steps towards the advancement of knowledge has never been posed; not to speak of what drive to knowledge could drive mankind to the point of dying with the light of an anticipatory wisdom in its eyes. Perhaps if one day an alliance has been established with the inhabitants of other stars for the purpose of knowledge, and knowledge has been communicated from star to star for a few millennia: perhaps enthusiasm for knowledge may then rise to such a high-water mark!

of the self cannot be adequately engaged apart from considering philosophy's internal division and its possible fate. In other words, if one can no longer affirm an essential self or an imperishable soul-substance and if one, by contrast, can only affirm the self as being, before all else, a social, cultural, and historical event or artifact, then this same self, this philosophically discovered, modified, and objectified figure, must have, according to the new dispensation, its whole life solely in the retrospective and reflective moments of the philosophical tradition.

But just as, while living contentedly, we inevitably believe in our being more than our non-being, so the modern self, even while entertaining itself with sceptical, pessimistic, or nihilistic insights, is a much stronger witness to its reality than any testimony to the contrary. To rest rather comfortably in this paradoxical position is what I would call the Foucauldian mode of modern selfhood whereas the push beyond it, the violent dismissal and rupture of this paradox, the Nietzschean.

If one were to look for the single item which sums up the above-mentioned distinction, one could do no better, I think, than to look to the prophetic tendency in Nietzsche's and Foucault's thought. It is safe to say that, just as it grows more vigorous in the former, so it grows less pronounced in the latter.[5] Different philosophical projects undoubtedly account for the contrast. Nietzsche wishes to plant and to see growing his most personally admired traits in the humanity of the future whereas Foucault, less nihilistic but more pessimistic, wishes to leave the future of humanity a question mark while hallowing the self's freedom in the present.[6] Furthermore, whereas Nietzsche makes a veritable practise of distinguishing between great souls and mean or average ones, Foucault's historical analyses tend to reverse this process.[7]

5 The early Foucault's prophetic inclination is, in fact, largely influenced by Nietzsche. We have it, for example, in the Conclusion of *Madness and Civilization*, in the essay, "Nietzsche, Genealogy, History," and in chapters nine and ten of *The Order of Things*. It is the rather obscure theme of a threatening dissolution aided and abetted by the will to knowledge but kept at bay by artistic creativity. Later, Foucault explicitly denounces the role of the prophet and the vision of a doomed rationality. (See, for example, the interview entitled "Critical Theory/Intellectual History" in *Politics, Philosophy, Culture*, 35-36.) Clearly committed to strategic, relatively specific critiques and investigations of the past/present nexus, he does not speculate about the future but only states that "everything is dangerous" and that his "position leads not to apathy but to a hyper- and pessimistic activism" (*The Foucault Reader*, 343).

6 A good discussion of the limited but "transgressing" freedom of the self may be found in Foucault's "What is Enlightenment?" (*The Foucault Reader*, 45-50). Here he tells us that critique "will separate out, from the contingency that has made us what we are, the possibility of no longer being, doing, or thinking what we are, do, or think" (46).

7 Even in his most "Nietzschean" of essays (i.e., "Nietzsche, Genealogy, History"), Foucault speaks of genealogy as being that practise wherein, among other things, "the veneration of

It would be another way of summing up to say that Nietzschean selfhood is essentially tragic whereas Foucauldian selfhood is essentially ironic.

The difference is, from a positive viewing, philosophical, personal, practical, ethical, and aesthetic. It is the great divide between two otherwise kindred spirits who both exhibit a kind of Socratic intensity with regard to integrating the way of reason with the way of living a life. To be of one piece, to not be divided into a public and private self flatly contradictory of each other, to find one's essence not in the few extraordinary events of one's life but in the whole course of living one's life extraordinarily, these measures and ways of proceeding characterize the Nietzschean and Foucauldian self as much as they do the Socratic one.[8]

The making of a more general distinction now presses upon me. The distinction between a more or less standardized or universal self, theoretically arrived at and anchored, and a more or less exceptional or ideal self. Now it may be that, as in the case of Socrates and his teaching, the standardized or universal self and the exceptional or ideal self achieve a singular union related to the potential of many or all human beings.[9]

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monuments becomes parody" (*Language, Counter-Memory, Practice*, 164).

8 Walter Kaufmann, in his *Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist*, devotes a whole chapter to Nietzsche's attitude towards Socrates. He states that this study "shows how Nietzsche, for whom Socrates was allegedly a 'villain', modelled his conception of his own task largely after Socrates' apology" (391).

9 Such a seemingly universalizable ideal as the proposition " knowledge is virtue" is what, not without contradiction or tension, Socrates upholds. It is precisely against this proposition that Nietzsche speaks when he, siding with Plato's "aristocratism" (which, he believes, struggles to refine it) and against Socrates "plebianism," posits its rather drab, uninteresting, and commonplace origin (*Beyond Good and Evil*, section 190).

> There is something in the morality of Plato that does not really belong to Plato but is merely encountered in his philosophy – one might say, in spite of Plato: namely, the Socratism for which he was really too noble. "Nobody wants to do harm to himself, therefore all that is bad is done involuntarily. For the bad do harm to themselves: this they would not do if they knew that the bad is bad. Hence the bad are bad only because of an error; if one removes the error, one necessarily makes them – good."
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> This type of inference smells of the *rabble* that sees nothing in bad actions but the unpleasant consequences and really judges, "it is stupid to do what is bad," while "good" is taken without further ado to be identical with "useful and agreeable." In the case of every moral utilitarianism, one may immediately infer the same origin and follow one's nose: one will rarely go astray.
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> Plato did everything he could in order to read something refined and noble into the proposition of his teacher – above all, himself. He

Historically speaking, however, the Socratic way of living and the Socratic doctrine follow distinct lines of transmission, the first being largely inspirational and the second pedagogical. A certain rigorous and austere devotion to the quality and character of one's life, to the independent functioning of one's reason, mark out the Socratic movement of exceptional selfhood as it enters into an Epictetus, an Augustine, a Montaigne, a Nietzsche, or a Foucault. Similarly, the Socratic movement of standardized selfhood spreads itself out as part of the historico-cultural sedimentation of various peoples and places. Of course, it can only be that, involved here, is but one movement of exceptional selfhood and one movement of a presumed commonality. If it is Nietzsche who throws the most light on the complexity pertaining to the modality of exceptional selfhood, it is Foucault who does the same with its counterpart.[10]

But perhaps it is once again necessary to emphasize the paradoxicalness of all these concrete convergences, conveyances, conceptions, and concerns of selfhood, of all these little lives, little faiths, and little events which ultimately dissolve in the dissoluble life of a still-flourishing selfhood. Highest or most refined faith, now as before, problematizes itself, questions its holy of holies, tests its strength by making proof of its weakness, and powerfully affirms itself even while denying itself. But there is clarity in these contradictions by virtue of the self's no longer being a thing but an event, by selfhood's no longer being, via the propagation of the species, an essentially unchanging condition but the intricate path of a large-scale happening.[11]

The reifying process, the reified fact of the self, is part of this happening, part of the present-day ontology even while it slips out of sight of its epistemology. There is no possibility of there being such a degree of discursive consistency that a totalizing theory could successfully accommodate the divergent strains and tendencies of selfhood. Constrained as much by our present constitution as liberated by its self-problematization, we can do no more than shuttle back and forth, pointing out what I should like to call the mythical, moral, and mortal confluences and crosscurrents of

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> was the most audacious of all interpreters and took the whole Socrates only the way one picks up a popular tune and folk song from the streets in order to vary it into the infinite and impossible . . .

10 This thesis shall be developed presently in the essay.
11 Of course both Nietzsche and Foucault tend to "eventalize" (to borrow a Foucauldian term) substances, unitary necessities, anthropological traits, historical constants, etc. See, for example, Nietzsche's short analysis of the cogito (*Beyond Good and Evil*, section 17) and Foucault's explanation of "eventalization" in "Questions of Method: An Interview with Michel Foucault" (*After Philosophy: End or Transformation?*, 104-106).

selfhood.[12]

By the mythical, I essentially mean the self's expansion. By the moral, I essentially mean the limitation of this expansion. And, by the mortal, I essentially mean the self's non-expansion and/or proximity to non-existence. Both in a most primitive and a most modern way, the first relates to exaltation and mastery, the second to interest and struggle, and the third to habit and servitude. With the first goes, crudely speaking, a name or title. With the second, a face or figure. And, with the third, a body or function. So it is that the illustrious reputation endures for a long time, the memory of a loved one for a shorter period, and the unadorned function or faceless body but an instant. However, the last, in a manner of speaking, becomes first, creating the complexity and ambiguity of the historically developing self and making it more than a name, a reputation, a figure when, first of all, interest and struggle awaken habit and servitude from their sleep and, in a second movement, ascend to exaltation and mastery.[13] Selfhood, in other words, increasingly expands its boundaries, overlaps and implicates itself in heterogeneous elements, grows opaque, obscure, and eventually as mysterious as the external world even while becoming familiar and firsthand as a designation, a commonality, a universal faith or certainty. But this revolutionary course of its development, concretely offering selfhood to so many and formally to all, does not destroy but only recodes and rearranges the hierarchical tendencies and strains of selfhood.[14]

The confluence of the primordial springs of selfhood – that part which escapes structuration and becomes a relatively fast-flowing current of flexible configurations – ends up effectively being the neo-mythical self of

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12 While such thinkers as Charles Taylor and Jürgen Habermas reject the Cartesian-Kantian self and dialectically relate selfhood to a socio-historical background, they nonetheless allow this self a kind of backdoor entry. In a way that bears the impress of the Christian belief in an immortal soul springing from the humble loins of mortality, they annunciate this self as a sort of general project that, despite its problematic origins and, indeed, by taking them into account, works towards some universal good.

13 Cf. the following passage in section two of the first essay of Nietzsche's *On the Genealogy of Morals*: "Rather it was when aristocratic value judgments *declined* that the whole antithesis "egoistic" "unegoistic" obtruded itself more and more on the human conscience – it is, to speak in my own language, the *herd* instinct that through this antithesis at last gets its word (and its words) in. And even then it was a long time before that instinct attained such domination that moral evaluation was actually stuck and halted at this antithesis . . ."

14 Cf. the following passage in *Beyond Good and Evil*, section 260: "There are *master morality* and *slave morality* – I add immediately that in all the higher and more mixed cultures there also appear attempts at mediation between these two moralities, and yet more often the interpenetration and mutual misunderstanding of both, and at times they occur directly alongside each other – even in the same human being, within a *single* soul."

modernity. That is, it is the universal selfhood of politico-juridical recognition and philosophical reflection. Here the moral tendency or strain is experienced as the ever-vigilant examination, protection, and elaboration of selfhood. On the other hand, the mortal tendency or strain is experienced as the routinely impersonal, mechanical, causal, contradictory, or harshly callous operation of such a large-scale vigilance.[15] In effect then, the neo-mythical self of modernity, under the aspect of a moral vigilance that goes even deeper and behind itself, captures what is culpable in itself and thereby grows doubly self-analytical. With a second movement, it becomes the exaltation and mastery of unmasking, of demythologizing the modern self. Hence the strange struggle between the self-threatening, self-problematizing integrity of this one operation and the self-protecting, self-perpetuating mission of the other.[16] It is the latest and perhaps last development of the politics of the modern self, its radicalization as a philosophical and ultimately very personal problem.

The Nietzschean and Foucauldian projects essentially move out in opposite directions from the same centre of radically problematized selfhood. They explore, with the ardour of a religious quest and with an equanimous mixture of moral concern, scientific curiosity, and divine aloofness, its whole range and compass. In the one case, it is, with respect to the historical life of selfhood, the highest of the high which is the investigative pole of attraction. In the other, it is the lowest of the low. Mythically speaking, the gaze for Nietzsche is primarily on the Dionysian self recovering itself, resplendent, once again ready to go over by going under. For Foucault, the gaze is primarily on the god's humble but active life in the state of dissolution. One preaches the Overman, the other the end of Man. One parades before us conquerors, rulers, and heroes. The other the mad, the sick, the poor, the depraved, the delinquent, the disciplined, and the criminal. One pronounces the bland middle-class spirit to be the degeneration of selfhood.[17] The other displays it as the crafty architect of the

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15 Perhaps no scholarly work peers so deeply into this negative drift of modern development as Foucault's *Discipline and Punish*. It is enough to say that he demonstrates the "disciplinary" side of Enlightenment society as being dramatically at odds with Kant's notion of the self as an absolute end.

16 Here I am essentially thinking of the whole Enlightenment project. Despite Nietzsche's insights, this project cannot and must never go, as the most popular and wide-scale viewing of itself, beyond good and evil. Even Foucault, despite his antipathy towards making any grandiose moral claims or laying out specific programs, places himself in the Enlightenment tradition. See his essay "The Art of Telling the Truth," in *Critique and Power: Recasting the Foucault/Habermas Debate*.

17 Here is part of the passage on the "last man" in section five of the prologue to Nietzsche's *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*. Interpreting it as "the bland middle-class spirit" comes in light of what I take to be Nietzsche's parodic or satiric treatment of it.

modern age.[18] One yearns for the abyss, for the absolute break at the highest point of intoxication, of striving, of accomplishment. The other – even more systematically than his predecessor – seeks to make the self a radical questioner of present acceptations, a master destroyer of sustaining illusions while also the creator of a quieter heroism, a more indefinite, more open kind of horizon.

What is the active inertia and, perhaps, the very life of the modern self is its resistance to these subversive inclinations, its planting its presence – more than it knows or more than it can help – in the past and the future. On the other hand, this omnipresence of the modern self is already what accounts for its sharper look into the historical fluidity and ontological "vaporability" of selfhood.[19]

> And thus spoke Zarathustra to the people: "The time has come for man to set himself a goal. The time has come for man to plant the seed of his highest hope. His soil is still rich enough. But one day this soil will be poor and domesticated, and no tall tree will be able to grow in it. Alas, the time is coming when man will no longer shoot the arrow of his longing beyond man, and the string of his bow will have forgotten how to whirr!
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> "I say unto you: one must still have chaos in oneself to be able to give birth to a dancing star. I say unto you: you still have chaos in yourselves.
>
> "Alas, the time is coming when man will no longer give birth to a star. Alas, the time of the most despicable man is coming, he that is no longer able to despise himself. Behold, I show you the *last man.*
>
> "What is love? What is creation? What is longing? What is a star? thus asks the last man, and he blinks.
>
> "The earth has become small, and on it hops the last man, who makes everything small. His race is as ineradicable as the flea-beetle; the last man lives longest.
>
> "'We have invented happiness,' say the last men, and they blink. They have left the regions where it was hard to live, for one needs warmth. One still loves one's neighbor and rubs against him, for one needs warmth."

18 "It takes the rather naive optimism of the nineteenth century 'dandies' to imagine that the bourgeoisie is stupid. On the contrary, one has to reckon with its strokes of genius, and among these is precisely the fact of its managing to construct machines of power allowing circuits of profit, which in turn re-inforced and modified the power apparatuses in a mobile and circular manner. . . . The power of the bourgeoisie is self-amplifying, in a mode not of conservation but of successive transformations. Hence . . . its supple inventiveness." ("The Eye of Power" in Foucault's *Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings*, 160.

19 The risk is that the problematizing of selfhood, doubling back on itself, will ultimately become another "death of God." A growing socio-political dispersion of disbelief in this entity as entity, in perhaps its *value* as entity, would challenge its sanctified rule.

It is very hard for the modern self, taking itself to be a kind of evolutionary project or achievement, to grant that this more scientifically based faith is but a holdover from a mythically based one. Indeed, it is so very hard that, even in the act of being renounced, this faith clandestinely returns. The teleological principle is formally repudiated by both Nietzsche and Foucault but, as any detractor might be quick to point out, one oft speaks of a future mission for humankind and the other refers, if not so emphatically, to a present one. Simply put, the modern self cannot really repudiate itself even while doing so. Or, at least, it cannot respectably do so, indifferent to its survival or prospects even while dialoguing with itself in a seemingly contradictory fashion. One might say that Nietzsche's flamboyance and analytical ruthlessness force him to personally enact the end of the modern self – the end, that is, he idealizes and heroicizes. Foucault, by contrast, endures and maintains the tension of the paradox, softening it by carving out, as best he can, a formal area for one side of the matter and an informal area for the other.[20]

Given what has been said thus far, it is difficult to speak – at least, in the ordinary way – of a Nietzschean or Foucauldian theory of the self. Rather one confronts the self's dispersion, a kind of top, middle, and bottom range of selfhood as well as its insensibly merging into or emerging from non-self. In the case of Nietzsche, the style and arrangement of his work – the intertwining, connecting, and disconnecting of various themes – is a Dionysian discourse ranging from the most pathetically human and fragmentary to the most godlike and fully integrated conceptions of modern selfhood. From his question "What do I matter?" to the living of each moment as if it were to recur eternally. From the ego as a necessary fiction to the magnificently heroic spirit tragically but triumphantly affirming itself. From the mad hermit in his cave of darkness to the commanding eagle's eye view of Western civilization.[21]

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20 There is no question that Foucault draws a halting line between his "theoretical" work and other matters. He tells us that "the 'best' theories do not constitute a very effective protection against disastrous political choices. . . . [One does] not conclude from this that one may say just anything within the order of theory, but, on the contrary, that a demanding, prudent, 'experimental' attitude is necessary; at every moment, step by step, one must confront what one is thinking and saying with what one is doing, with what one is" ("Politics and Ethics: An Interview" in *The Foucault Reader*, 374).

21 Foucault on Nietzsche and madness:

> It is of little importance on exactly which day in the autumn of 1888 Nietzsche went mad for good, and which of his texts no longer afford philosophy but psychology: all of them, including the postcard to Strindberg, belong to Nietzsche, and all are related to *The Birth of Tragedy*. But we must not think of this continuity in terms of a

It is the all too stationary spirit of the modern self, principally hallowed by Kant, which Nietzsche fulminates against. Perhaps much of his work can be viewed as an enormously diverse, wide-ranging assault upon it. If this sounds displeasing to some ears, let it be considered as testimony to the strength of the modern self and its Kantian sanctification that so much force is deployed against it. That this self wants to set boundaries and make laws for itself by way of reason, *its* reason – this is the crypto-presumption and arrogance which draws the fire, the wrath, the countermeasure of a more openly demonstrated and even, let us go so far as to say, greater presumption and arrogance.[22]

Hence the Nietzschean call: *Incipit tragoedia*.[23] It is almost as if that, by way of Socrates but against Socrates, Nietzsche returns to Sophocles. And the great pride and presumption, of course, is that the modern self, by tearing itself away from all real and false modesty, all inducements to comfort, security, and longevity, can be the embodiment of both spirits. Hence Nietzsche's life. Hence Nietzsche's legacy. What matters, what must be insisted upon, is this atavism of selfhood continually renewed. That the modern self can only flourish (though, perhaps, not survive) in the greatest stretch and measure of itself. That, to paraphrase Hamlet, it has much music, an excellent voice, but only if it can be played from the lowest note to the top of its compass.[24]

This artistry of selfhood finds its greatest theme, its most triumphant testimony and challenging inspiration, in high tragedy. However, there is also the comic register of Socratic, Nietzschean, and (later) Foucauldian equanimity. Nothing flat or insipid here: it can be either the needling irritation of a studied irony, the mocking buffoonery of an outrageous

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> system, of a thematics, or even of an existence: Nietzsche's madness – that is, the dissolution of his thought – is that by which his thought opens out onto the modern world" *(Madness and Civilization*, 288).

22 How could humble living, sickness, and lack of worldly success maintain this presumption for very long? And how could Foucault, a great lover of Nietzsche but also an admirer of Kant and ultimately an upholder of Enlightenment values, not end up denouncing it? For we find him saying: "The solemnity with which everyone who engages in philosophical discourse reflects on his own time strikes me as a flaw. I can say so all the more firmly since it is something I have done myself; and since, in someone like Nietzsche, we find this incessantly – or, at least, insistently enough. I think we should have the modesty to say to ourselves that . . . the time we live in is *not* the unique or fundament or irruptive point in history where everything is completed and begun again" (Critical Theory/Intellectual History" in *Politics, Philosophy, Culture*, 35-36).
23 *The Gay Science*, sections 81, 340, and 370.
24 *Hamlet*, III. Ii. 371-380.

presumption, or the highly skilful evasiveness of a quick-change artist. In all three we recognize what we should call, dramatically speaking, characterizations. But these characters, in effect, create themselves. At one and the same time they are *eirons* and *alazons* – characters who are both more and less than they appear to be.[25] This is their artistry: that they may act and know that they are acting even (and very much) to the point of commenting upon, critiquing, or in some other way subverting these ploys of feigned ignorance (Socrates), these bombastic, self-dramatising tendencies (Nietzsche), and these feints of hand and subtle games of hide and seek (Foucault).[26] In all three cases, there is a definite breach of the usual proprieties. What allows it to be successful is their making a virtue and a virtuosity of revealing themselves, of involving selfhood not just in a range of work, but as a range within their work.

It is necessary, I believe, to deny that there is anything like a theory of the self in Nietzsche. However, it is another matter to interpret his work in such a way. It is, moreover, permissible to grant that it readily lends itself to such an interpretation. If, for example, what I am putting down here can be taken to be a Nietzschean theory of the self, it is by virtue of my perceiving not only an interesting but also an intimate and inspirational connection between his life and thought. To this extent, the theme of tragic heroism looms large as well as the complementary one of a kind of divine comedy which effaces it.[27] The title of Alexander Nehamus's book, *Nietzsche: Life as Literature*, best sums up this overriding affirmation of the grand spectacle of selfhood

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25 For a discussion of these types, see Northrop Frye's *Anatomy of Criticism*, 39-40.
26 I will limit myself to but one example of these public scenes or professional displays of "self-recognition." It is the close of the Introduction to Foucault's *The Archeology of Knowledge*. Pretending that a hostile critic is grilling him, he writes: "Aren't you sure of what you're saying? Are you going to change yet again, shift your position according to the questions that are put to you, and say that the objections are not really directed at the place from which you were speaking? Are you going to declare yet again that you have never been what you have been reproached with being? Are you already preparing the way out that will enable you in your next book to spring up somewhere else and declare as you're doing now: "no, no, I'm not where you are lying in wait for me, but over here, laughing at you?" (17).
27 "But to me, on the contrary, there seems to be nothing *more* worth taking seriously, among the rewards for it being that some day one will perhaps be allowed to take [the problems of morality] *cheerfully*. For cheerfulness – or in my own language *gay science* – is a reward: the reward of a long, brave, industrious, and subterranean seriousness, of which, to be sure, not everyone is capable. But on the day we can say with all our hearts, "Onwards! our old morality too is part *of the comedy!*" we shall have discovered a new complication and possibility for the Dionysian drama of "The Destiny of the Soul" – and one can wager that the grand old eternal comic poet of our existence will be quick to make use of it (Section 7 of the Preface to *The Genealogy of Morals*).

on the vast stage which both precedes and outlasts it.[28]

With Foucault, the scientific, systematic, or theoretical dimension does make a solid appearance[29] and, if not eliminating, greatly reduces the chances of his work being given a wide range of interpretations. Its tendency, unlike Nietzsche's, is to view the self downward to its zero point. I shall attempt to discuss this tendency and also indicate how Foucault manages to make room for a kind of restrained Nietzschean upswing of selfhood.

Let us begin by remarking that Foucault provides a good study for this theme of theorizing about the self. For it is also a "theory" of such theorizing which his thought thematises – a theory pertaining to the function and limits of theory.[30]

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28 There are many examples in great literature of this strange affirmation. Recently rereading some of Chekhov's short stories, I came across the one called "Gusev." It is about the last few days in the life of a terminally ill soldier. Far from his native Russia in the sick bay of a tramp steamer, he converses dispiritedly with a few souls in a similar condition as himself. At the same time, he intermittently reminisces about his past. Then he dies; his body is placed in a gunnysack and thrown into the ocean. As it sinks, a number of fish inquisitively play around it before a shark looms upon the scene and, after some hesitation, tears open the sack.

> [O]ne of the gridirons falls out, frightens the pilot fish and striking the shark on the flank, sinks rapidly to the bottom. "Meanwhile, up above, in that part of the sky where the sun is about to set, clouds are massing, one resembling a triumphal arch, another a lion, a third a pair of scissors. A broad shaft of green light issues from the clouds and reaches to the middle of the sky; a while later, a violet beam appears along side of it and then a golden one and a pink one . . . The heavens turn a soft lilac tint. Looking at this magnificent enchanting sky, the ocean frowns at first, but soon it, too, takes on the tender, joyous passionate colors for which it is hard to find a name in the language of man."

29 The whole business of whether or not Foucault is engaged in legitimate theoretical work is, I suspect, controversial. To my way of thinking, there are three ways of looking at it: 1) the way he deals with theory methodologically; 2) the way in which his position on theory exhibits itself negatively (by being paradoxical); and 3) the way in which his position on theory exhibits itself positively (by being, once again, paradoxical but according to a different logic). Methodologically speaking, Foucault quite convincingly displays theories as being historical configurations of discursive practise which appear and disappear. Philosophically speaking, however, he undercuts his own theoretical position (i.e., his theory too is a historical configuration and must disappear). Extra-philosophically speaking, however, his implicitly global view of theories both affirms and negates itself. For how could he put forward a theoretical and practical operation historicizing theories which does not validate itself by implicitly invalidating itself – which, in other words, does not heavily suggest its own eventual demise or its being sublated?

30 For an excellent discussion of his general attitude to theory, see the first part of his "Two

To put it another way, he presents no grand or totalizing picture of the self. Such a picture always presupposes the possibility of non-problematicity, of, indeed, having finally found and put together all the pieces of the puzzle. But to regard the self so stintingly, to think that it should likely be this rather *simple* kind of puzzle, and not to consider that it may very well be an ever-changing and even ephemeral one – this is but a presumption and a prejudice. It is the presumption of traditional philosophy and the prejudice of the self-valorizing self which traditionally philosophizes.

The problem for Foucault may be stated thus: how does one theorize about the self and yet not set one's self up as the paradigm? How does one avoid extrapolating, idealizing, or mythologising the historically situated self? How if not by different, overlapping approaches or areas of investigation which, although they may conflict according to a foreground estimation, nevertheless engender, along sightlines stretching to infinity, the prospect of an eventual coherence and stability? Of course, the latter is nothing at all like a strictly logical order. It is rather an aesthetic sighting, an appreciative survey of the different analyses, separately so sharply detailed and revealing, and the sense of their sloping off into the distance to form a single horizon. In other words, instead of the forced structuring and standardization of the self, instead of its being tightly bound into a strictly logical or argumentative whole, there is the more supple theoretical accommodation which is really three approaches – three kinds of practises or domains to which the self relates. Allow me to call them the *epistemic* or *intellectual*, the *institutional* or *social*, and the *aesthetic* or *ethical*.[31]

The first then concerns the formation of the knowledgeable or intellectual self, the second the socially conditioned or disciplined self, and the third the privileged or self-creating self. It is better, no doubt, to think of these three selves as three modes of selfhood or subjectivity.[32] Moreover, they not only run parallel to one another but overlap, intertwine, disconnect, interfere, etc. To make them analytically distinguishable is to conduct, in different historical

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Lectures" in *Power/Knowledge*, 78-87.

31 "What I have studied are three traditional problems: 1) What are the relations we have to truth through scientific knowledge, to those 'truth games' which are so important in civilization and in which we are both subject and object? (2) What are the relationships we have to others through those strange strategies and power relationships? And (3) what are the relationships between truth, power, and self?"

"I would like to finish all this with a question: What could be more classic than these questions and more systematic than the evolution through questions one, two, and three and back to the first?" (*Technologies of the Self*, 15)

32 These three modes primarily relate to, in the same order: 1) *The Order of Things*, 2) *Discipline and Punish*, and 3) *The History of Sexuality*, vol. 2 and 3. Of course, his other major works feature them as well.

areas, different forms of historical investigation which necessarily entail or highlight one of these modes. The two modes, however, which on each occasion are thrown into the background, still trace varyingly distinct or diffuse courses. It is true that, for the most part, they fall outside the range of the analysis with its mode of the self under study. Nevertheless, this analysis does not so much close itself off to the subtending ones as to turn the lights down on them. The reason for this methodological optics is to allow one of the three modes, alternately speaking, to register itself fully and without interference.[33]

Thus the epistemic mode of selfhood corresponds to, in the case of Foucault's work, a historical investigation of the birth of the human sciences. It is essentially the relation of the knowledge of the self to the larger domains of epistemic discourse or formal interpretation of the world (*The Order of Things*). This mode of selfhood is therefore inseparable from and transformable in accordance with the slow movement and periodically rapid displacement of such domains. The late eighteenth century, for example, witnesses a shift from the view of all being as a transcendent order to the view of the natural world as a transcendental ordering. By the same token, intellectual selfhood no longer is simply a matter of reasoning about what the self matter-of-factly represents to itself, but also about this now mysterious, sophisticated process of representation. As such, intellectual selfhood becomes a process of objectifying itself, of making the self both a subject and object of study. Here Foucault locates the modern dilemma of a knowledge which, though extending or rearranging itself indefinitely, can never escape the conflicting aspects of its operation and, contrary to its fundamental intention, be rid of its fundamental confusion.[34]

With respect to the mode of socially conditioned selfhood, Foucault undertakes a study of the penal system and its relation to other confining or restrictive institutions. Because of the shift in perspective, intellectual selfhood now functions principally within the bounds of plans, programs, operations, etc. which continually interact and often form larger, more complex networks and operations. This both discursive and non-discursive

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33 The Forward to the English edition of *The Order of Things*, for example, spells out quite clearly Foucault's way of proceeding and the general tenor of his philosophico-historical investigation. Here both the privileged mode of selfhood (i.e., what the great scientist and discoverer best exemplify) is thrown into the shade along with the socially conditioned mode of selfhood (i.e., what refers most strongly to specific institutional practises and disciplines). Nonetheless Foucault is at pains to tell us that this work is a comparative study (x) and 'open site' (xii), and that it should not "be taken as a rejection of any other possible approach" (xiv).

34 Foucault gives this theme thorough treatment in chapter nine of *The Order of Things*.

activity is mainly the managing of bodies in relation to space and minds in relation to functions and fields of operation. Here is a disciplinary form of power which contrasts in breadth and subtlety with the one of the preceding historical period. The latter, in his book, *Discipline and Punish*, Foucault names monarchical or juridical power. The shift from the one to the other results in the inscribing of an individualizing process in the mode of socially conditioned selfhood. Such a process is also objectifying in terms of subjecting selves to examination, surveillance, placement, and correction. It is, lastly, also a learning process of self-monitoring and self-regulation.[35]

The third mode of selfhood is the privileged or self-creating one (*The History of Sexuality*). While the first mode is the life of the self in its epistemic space and the second in its social space, the third is the life of the self in its ethical or "free" space. Here the self problematizes its conduct largely in relation to the freedom, power, and privilege it enjoys. For the purpose of investigating this mode of selfhood, Foucault turns his attention to certain schools, circles, and personages of antiquity.[36] Parallelling the other two approaches or perspectives upon selfhood, the intense lighting up of this area throws the epistemic and socially conditioned modes into the shade. However, the very fact that he undertakes a historical study, historiographically specified, guarantees their at least marginal proximity. For example, Foucault points to there being, in ancient Greece, a general concern for good government and, with respect to the ruling class, effective mastery over others. Such concern translates into, at the aesthetic or ethical level, a theory and practise of self-control.[37] The practise of self-control is the game of freedom and ethical choice. The theory of it is the set of rules governing this game. Later developments modify the whole setup, creating a new importance for the link between the political and the familial. Accordingly, there occurs, for the male holders of power and privilege, a problematization of the marital relationship. The latter, not cancelling but going beyond the condition of the husband's being a master and progenitor, becomes the issue of his being a partner and lover.[38]

Such then are the three overlapping (but not interlocking) approaches to the theoretical analysis of selfhood. The first addresses the epistemic space (the

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35 Of course such twentieth century writers as Kafka, Orwell, and Huxley precede Foucault in investigating this internalizing or consciousness-altering process.
36 See Foucault's *The Use of Pleasure* (*The History of Sexuality, Vol. 2*) and *The Care of the Self* (*The History of Sexuality, Vol. 3*). Among other texts, he examines those of Hippocrates, Isocrates, Plato, Aristotle, Xenophon, Epicurus, Seneca Epictetus, Pliny the Younger, Plutarch, and Galen.
37 See chapters three and four of *The Use of Pleasure.*
38 See parts five and six of *The Care of the Self*.

self mainly as a discursive agent or function); the second the social space (the self mainly as a physical agent or object); and the thirst the ethical or "free" space (the self mainly as self-constituting, self-stylizing singularity). These approaches are diffusely connected because the modes of selfhood inhabit one another just as they split off, separate, or migrate from one to another. As Foucault shows, a specific kind of historical research, specifically situated, can make a spectacle of any one of these modes by profoundly limiting the view of the others. (And, for this reason, some find it a distorted and reductive viewing while others a revealing and enlarging one.) By virtue of this manner of theorizing, honour is paid to the wealth of evidence testifying to the self's multiple character and protean range. Here, one might say, Foucault assiduously extends the study of the non-heroic scale of selfhood which, in Nietzsche's work, is more or less a lacuna.

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So much of the self which is personal. So much of the self which is public. So much both separate from and bound up with the world along a continuum which doubles back on itself, cancels itself out, and intensely affirms discontinuity. Each of us feels our singularity and, at the same time, our nothingness in the face of so many other singularities. Like Leibnizian monads, we all have our differences, construed to be great or small, while hovering in a great sea of cosmic anonymity and indifference. For there is no longer, philosophically speaking, the one Supreme Monad to count among us and to make the crucial distinctions. To the extent that the State now fulfils this function, we collectively guard against the loss of optimal selfhood even while knowing its potential for dissolving everything into the opposite state of affairs.[39] But selfhood must go on tragically and ironically, heroically and non-heroically, as long as we suffer from the question. And when we no longer suffer the question, when, for whatever reason, there is no question of the question, we —

39 See part five of *The History of Sexuality, Vol. 1*. It deals with the modern state's effectively investing itself with the power of life and death over whole populations.

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